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P reface

This dissertation consists o f four chapters that provide detailed information about
the current use (CU) property taxation program and the determinants o f program
effectiveness. An introduction to the CU program and the approach o f property
assessment is given in the first chapter. This explores the CU assessment formula in
general and reviews CU assessment o f agricultural land in New Hampshire, giving an
explanation o f why the CU assessment o f agricultural land in New Hampshire needs to be
revised.
The second chapter, “Current Use Property Taxation in Conserving New
Hampshire Land: An Empirical Investigation Using Multiple Imputations,” is centered on
the CU program in New Hampshire. Since the inception o f the CU program in 1974, the
program has been widely known and considered the corner stone in conserving
undeveloped land from being developed for urbanized uses, such as commercial or
residential development. About fifty percent o f total land in the state is enrolled in the
program. The purpose o f the second chapter is to examine the factors that lead
landowners to enroll land in the program. Town level data for the years 1999-2011 from
231 towns is used in the analysis. The factors addressed in the chapter cover some CU
program related features and the influence o f two central business districts, Boston in
Massachusetts and Manchester in New Hampshire, in determining enrollment or
withdrawal from the program. The chapter also focuses on comparing missing data
treatment techniques that exist in the econometric literature. The missing data treatments
considered are simple deletion, mean substitution and multiple imputations. The results

suggest possible tax savings from the program as the major determinant in enrolling land
in the CU program.
The third chapter, “Determinants o f Current-Use Property Tax Programs in the
U.S.,” explores the determinants in implementing a CU program and imposing different
CU withdrawal penalties in the U.S. All states, except Michigan, have implemented some
sort of a CU assessment program during the years between 1956 and 1997. Owing to the
period o f program implementation, I chose to study the years between 1949-1997 to
understand the factors that led to program implementation and specific distribution o f
withdrawal penalties.

The techniques used in the third chapter are duration analysis,

competing-risk regressions and random effect multinomial logit analysis. The results
confirm that most CU programs are implemented due to unprecedented growth in urban
land in states that aim to protect agricultural land. According to the results, CU program
withdrawal penalties are less common in states that are highly dependent on agriculture.
The fourth chapter, “Evaluation o f Current-Use Property Tax Programs
Effectiveness,” studies the CU program s’ effectiveness in discouraging conversion o f
undeveloped land to more urbanized uses. Previous research, as well as findings from the
previous two chapters, suggests that receiving a considerable property tax relief has been
one of the major determinants o f enrolling land in the CU program. However, some o f
the features o f the CU program may discourage land development. The features
emphasized in this chapter are CU withdrawal penalties and the presence o f restrictive
agreements on land development. A state level study and a case study from New
Hampshire are presented in the fourth chapter. Finding detailed information on property
tax rates and CU withdrawal penalties for all the states was a challenging task in the

analysis. Therefore, using available information on property taxes, capitalization rates
and land assessment values; a simulated database consisting o f state level CU withdrawal
penalties was developed as part o f the work done in the chapter. For the case study, new
residential permits issued in a given year in New Hampshire are used as a proxy measure
for residential land development rates.

Results obtained using random effect panel

analysis o f the state level study do not support the hypothesis that CU withdrawal
penalties result in. slower development o f land across states. However, the percentage o f
land enrolled in the CU program in New Hampshire suggests that an increase in land
enrollment in the state CU program is linked to lower residential land development.
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A bstract

E ssa y s o n C u r r e n t U se P r o p e r ty T a x a tio n

by
Darshana Udayanganie
University o f New Hampshire, September 2013

Conservation o f agricultural and forestry land has taken on a new urgency as
development patterns have exploded over the past few decades, due to demand for
residential, industrial and commercial land uses in the U.S. As a result, numerous land
conservation programs have been implemented over the years. Current Use Property
Taxation is one o f the land conservation programs that was initiated in the 1960s,
introducing some property tax relief for landowners who wished to keep undeveloped
productive land in current use without developing it for more urbanized uses.
The substantial property tax relief landowners receive by enrolling land in the
Current Use program was believed to be the main determinant in avoiding property tax
induced land development. However, the forgone property tax revenue was a concern for
state and local governments. In order to recapture forgone tax revenues and also to
discourage enrollment o f land for short-term property tax gains, withdrawal penalties and
restrictions on land development were introduced. Current Use program features are not
consistent across states and the reasons for interstate differences are not clear.
This dissertation explores the factors that lead to such variations across states and
whether such variations in fact lead to differences in land development. One chapter
xii

focuses on detailing the factors that lead New Hampshire landowners to enroll land in the
program, while another chapter explores the factors that determined differences in
program features across states. The last chapter explores whether the Current Use
program is effective in slowing the land development in the U.S. by considering a townlevel case study from New Hampshire and also a state level analysis.

Chapter 1

1

I n t r o d u c t io n

1.1 In trod u ction

Conversion o f agricultural and forestland or other open space land for residential and
commercial development has been a matter o f great concern over the past few decades.
Conservation of open space land not only delays haphazard development, but also promises
benefits such as regional food supply and environmental pollution control. For many people,
natural resources are an important part o f their lives. Therefore, preservation o f natural areas
generally benefits the economic wellbeing o f current and future residents. Development
pressures result in an appreciation o f land value. Although this value increment is beneficial
for the landowner, it may not be helpful for their ability to pay increasing property taxes,
especially if a landowner relies on income from the land in order to cover property tax bills.
Property taxes based on the market value o f open space in the urban fringe areas are more
likely to be higher than the land's current potential income (Malme, 1993). Therefore,
property taxes become a burden for landowners at the urban fringe. Hence, landowners may
be enticed to sell a portion or all o f the land when property taxes become a burden.
Numerous property tax relief programs have been introduced (Stienbarger, 2004) over the
years to provide an economic incentive for the owners to retain their lands in rural uses
without selling for more urbanized uses.
1

The Current Use (CU) Property Taxation program is one o f the preferential property
taxation systems adopted in the U.S. to slow down the pace o f tax-induced and marketinduced development. The CU program focuses on the land's income potential in its
traditional uses, rather than on the fluctuating real estate market value o f undeveloped land in
property tax calculations. Lands that qualify for the CU program include undeveloped
farmland, forestland, certified tree farms, wetlands and even other sites unsuitable for
agriculture. CU programs became a trend in states in the 1970s even though some states had
adopted similar programs before 1970. Such programs have been widely accepted across the
country over the past two decades. A property taxation system based on the current use o f
undeveloped land is an effective way to provide a shield against higher property taxes.
Therefore, the CU Taxation program makes ownership o f lands less burdensome for the
urban fringe landowners (England, 2011).
The primary focus o f this dissertation is to discuss CU program characteristics, its
success factors, reasons for different program features and its effectiveness in land
conservation in the U.S. However, empirical studies that support or confirm those theoretical
suggestions are lacking. This dissertation contributes to the CU literature with three detailed
empirical studies that unfolds in chapters 2 to 4. For the empirical studies, I' consider CU
program features at state level and in New Hampshire. Chapter 2 focuses on town level data
in New Hampshire in predicting specific features that could attract landowners to enroll land
in the program. Chapter 3 focuses on predicting specific determinants that lead to
implementation o f CU programs and imposition o f withdrawal penalties in states at different
years, starting from the 1950s to the end o f the 1990s. Chapter 4 focuses on evaluating CU
program features such as withdrawal penalties and restrictive agreements’ effectiveness in

2

conserving land in the U.S. Most o f the CU programs are implemented at the local
government level and therefore collection o f data on CU programs at the state level was
difficult. Consequently, a simulated dataset was developed for analyses done in Chapter 4
and the developed database is another contribution to the CU literature.
Unprecedented growth in conversion o f land led to the initiation o f many conservation
programs that targeted protection o f rural land and rural characteristics. Before I discuss the
CU program, providing some background knowledge about alternative land conservation
programs is important. As a result, the rest o f this chapter is devoted to providing some
information on alternative land conservation programs in the U.S., which follows with a
detailed background o f CU program characteristics. The most notable and highly discussed
feature o f CU programs is the use value assessment o f lands enrolled in the CU program.
Then, a theoretical explanation o f the CU value assessment formula is presented in this
chapter. The last section o f the chapter reviews the existing CU assessment for agricultural
land in New Hampshire.

1.2 Alternative Land Policies in Conserving Land
Potential benefits o f preserving land are not only gained by the landowners living
near conserved land, but also by the public living in the region too. Open space preservation
or slowing o f conversion o f farm and forest land into residential and commercial purposes
led to many legislations and programs. The programs or legislations introduced by
government entities and private organizations in the past include exclusive agricultural
zoning, purchase and transfer o f development rights, conservation easements, tax-credit
programs and public land etc.

The selection o f a conservation program by a landowner depends on a couple o f
criteria. As shown in table 1.1, landowners can decide whether they want to maintain the
ownership o f the land or not and whether they need any monetary compensation for
conservation etc. Hence, the “bundle o f rights” that comes with the ownership o f the land,
may be exchanged or given-up upon conservation. The “bundle o f rights” may include the
right to occupy, lease, use, sell and develop the land at the owner’s discretion. However, the
important question is “why do landowners decide to conserve land?” The economic rewards
the landowners receive are believed to be the primary incentives for conservation. Economic
rewards may be received in terms o f tax relief on income, property or estate taxes in return
for conveying their real property rights.
With several alterative programs to land conservation, it is important that a landowner
considers a program that fits his/her land conservation motivation. This section summarizes
some o f the land conservation programs and covers how those programs meet conservation
efforts and the incentives landowners would receive for conservation.

Purchase o f Development Rights IPD Rl: The rights to develop a land for residential
or commercial purposes come with the ownership o f land. The purchase o f development
rights involves the sale o f rights to develop the land, while all other rights remain with the
landowner. Once an offer to purchase development rights is made by a land trust or an
agency linked to .the local government, the selling o f development rights by a landowner is a
completely voluntary process. When an agreement is made between the landowner and the
land trust or the local government’s agency, a permanent deed restriction is placed on the
property that restricts development, which ensures the land remains an agricultural, forestry

or open space land in perpetuity. The owner could sell the land, lease the land or pass it to
heirs with the deed restriction.

According to Kline and Wichlens (1994), 18 states have

active PDR programs. Once the land’s development rights are sold, the value o f the land
basically comes down to the agricultural land value. This gives a substantial tax relief on
inheritance tax liability (Kline & Wichlens, 1994).

Transfer o f Development Rights: Transfer o f development rights (TDR) is another
option available to protect agricultural lands. With TDR, the rights to develop a.land are
transferred from one area to another. When the development rights are transferred,
development densities (“building bonus”) allowed in the areas being developed increase
(Stinson, 1996). For example, TDR in an area which requires at least 1/4 acre per unit o f
development will increase the development densities by requiring only 1/6 acre per unit if
“building bonuses” are received in return to TDR. The increase in density is an incentive for
developers in a growth zone, known as a “receiving area,” to buy development rights from a
preservation area, known as a “sending area” (see figure 1.1). Although TDR programs’
objectives resemble those o f PDR, TDR needs to occur in a more controlled setting to
determine “sending areas” and “receiving areas.” With TDR, development rights can be
directly transferred to a developer or to a TDR bank established by a local government.

Conservation Easements: A conservation easement is a restriction placed on a land
parcel to protect natural or man-made resources, and is considered to be one o f the primary
tools o f land conservation today (Bowers & Daniels, 1997; Gutanski, 2000; Lindstrom,
2008). Conservation easements allow continued use o f land for agriculture, forestry, ranching

etc., while protecting the open space and natural value o f the land. Using easements, private
landowners decide to protect land by conveying some or most o f their rights to use the land
to a nonprofit organization, a government agency or a land trust that is responsible for
ensuring that the requirements o f easements are fulfilled. This legally binding contract may
be for a specified time period or in perpetuity. The easement holder is responsible for
monitoring and enforcing restrictions on the property as specified in the covenant (Andrus,
1982; Lindstrom, 2008). For example, if an agricultural land is specified as a conservation
easement, then the easement holder needs to ensure that the agricultural land will remain
conducive to agriculture in the future. As with other easements, agricultural easements limit
or may prohibit development o f the land for residential or commercial purposes. However, an
easement agreement does not absolve the property owner from traditional responsibilities,
such as property taxes, upkeep and maintenance. As discussed before, monetary benefits a
landowner receives offer motivation for the owner to declare a land as an easement. Federal
income tax and/or property tax benefits a landowner receives for easements are state and
locally determined, and are substantial.
The federal tax incentives that encourage the donation o f a conservation easement
include the following: an income tax deduction based on the easement’s appraisal value and
exclusion o f the easement’s value from the property for estate tax purposes; and an additional
estate tax exclusion o f up to 40 percent o f the value o f the land included in the easement.
Sometimes people refer to easements as PDR, although conservation easements are not
actually equivalent to PDR. Conservation easements consider land conservation goals
without regulation, without adversity and often even without government involvement.
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Conservation easements are valuable as a land protection tool that complements regulation,
land acquisition and tax policies to ensure optimum public benefits (Pidot, 2005).

Agricultural Zoning: Agricultural zoning, which began in the 1920s, aims to protect
viability o f agriculture in a region, in order to protect communities that are concerned about
economic viability o f agricultural activities. Local governments enact agricultural zoning
through collaborative agreements with farmers, businesses, residents, developers or anyone
who may be affected by zoning ordinance. Agricultural zoning governs regulations to
prevent farmland from being converted to nonfarm uses and also to protect agricultural land
from nonfarm intrusion. Establishing agricultural zoning makes agricultural land affordable
for new owners and makes agricultural production profitable.

Agricultural zoning also is

helpful in preserving the rural character o f a community, which prevents communities from
constant increases in property taxes due to rises in land value and increases in demand for
public services. With agricultural zoning, the density o f residential development is controlled
by requiring a minimum size o f agricultural land in order to build a non-agricultural related
dwelling. The minimum size o f a lot depends on the intensity o f the agricultural activity. For
example, a farm with livestock and cropping operations may require 160 acres to get
permission to build a nonagricultural dwelling, whereas, a farm allocated for horticultural
activities may require a minimum o f 25 acres. With some zoning, clustered residential
development is allowed.

7

1.3 Current Use Property Taxation Program Features

The CU program that initiated in Maryland in 1956, introduced very important
property tax reforms at state and local levels over the past few decades. Although the primary
objective o f the program is to provide property tax relief to agricultural and forestry
landowners (in some states even open space land), some o f the CU program features are in
place to discourage land development as well. Variations in program features make the
program differ across states in the areas o f enrollment procedure, enrollment eligibility, use
value assessment procedures, presence o f restrictive agreements on development and the
imposition o f CU withdrawal penalties. This section summarizes variations o f the above
program features across states, which is followed by a theoretical description on how CU
assessments are done. The impact o f different features o f the program on land conservation
and land conversion is evaluated in later chapters.
In some states CU program enrollment is automatic. In other states where the
enrollment is voluntary, landowners are still required to file an application. In either case,
enrolled lands are assessed not at the market value, but at their current use value for tax
purposes. In the states with automatic enrollment, landowners qualify for the tax benefit if
the land qualifies for CU assessment. In contrast, in the states with voluntary enrollment,
landowners qualify for the tax benefit at their discretion, which requires submission o f an
application to qualify for the tax benefit. To qualify for the tax benefit, applications may be
submitted each year or just once as long as the use o f the land is unchanged. There are 13
states with automatic enrollment, while 36 states operate with voluntary enrollment. In
chapters 3 and 4, I evaluate the reasons for and outcomes o f such differences in program
enrollment across states.

Eligibilities to receive tax benefits also differ across states and vary in terms o f the
required minimum size o f a parcel, a history o f eligible use or a minimum cash income from
specified rural use (England, 2011). For example, in New Hampshire for a land to qualify for
the tax benefit, whether it be a farm, forest, an unproductive land or any combination o f
above lands, it has to be at least ten acres. If the land is a wetland, then the size o f the land
has to be less than ten acres. Otherwise, any size o f agricultural or horticultural land
qualifies, if the annual gross income from crop sales totals at least $2,500 per year. In
contrast, Arizona does not have any minimum requirement for land size or a minimum cash
income for a land to qualify for the benefit.
Another program feature that makes CU programs vary across states is the presence
o f restrictive agreements on development. If state CU programs include a restrictive
agreement, landowners are required to refrain from land development for a certain number o f
years. For example, in California and Washington CU program landowners are refrained for
ten years from developing the enrolled land. I f a land is withdrawn before the maturity period
of the restrictive agreement, penalties are imposed.

Chapter 3 gives more details on

restrictive agreements o f states and chapter 4 evaluates whether these restrictive agreements
lead to differences in land development compared to the states with no restrictive
agreements.
Penalties for CU withdrawal, which include a payment fee for landowners who
withdraw land from the program, result in differences in CU programs across states. Based
on withdrawal penalties, CU programs can fall into one o f two categories: preferential
property taxation or deferred CU taxation. With preferential taxation, a CU withdrawal
penalty is not imposed, and the landowners enjoy lower property taxes as long as lands are

enrolled in the program. In contrast, in deferred taxation states, landowners are required to
pay a penalty upon withdrawal from the program. The penalties can be based on the market
value o f land at the time of sale (market value penalty) or could be dependent on the amount
of property tax savings landowners received (roll-back penalty) while enrolled in the
program. Market value penalties range between 10-20% o f the land’s sale value, whereas the
penalties based on property tax savings depend on tax savings from the past 3-10 years. The
number of years considered in roll-back penalty varies from state to state. Chapters 3 and 4
provide further details on CU withdrawal penalties and evaluate possible influences o f
withdrawal penalties on land development.

1.4 Theoretical Background in Assessing Agricultural Current Use Land
Assessment o f land for property tax purposes plays the major role in deriving tax
relief for CU landowners. The transparency and accuracy in value assessment m ay b e the
main features attracting more landowners to enroll their land, and keeping those parcels
enrolled in the program for a longer period of time or in perpetuity. Hence, accurate
calculation of the income potential o f CU land is important in most o f the states. In contrast,
some other states specify a certain percentage o f the market value as the CU value. Basic
challenges in use value assessment arise in determining the net income stream generated by
agricultural land, and the appropriate capitalization rate to convert that net revenue stream to
use value. The capitalization rate, which varies considerably across states, is the ratio
between the projected net operating income produced by an asset and its current market value
(Wyoming Department of Revenue, 2010). Most o f the states rely on the Farm Credit
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Services (FCS) or Federal Land Bank (FLB) rate o f interest as a principal component o f the
capitalization rate (Kansas Department of Revenue, 2000).

The price o f a developed land parcel is comprised o f several components (Anderson,
2011). The components are capitalized net income o f land, value o f capital improvement,
value

o f accessibility and value o f expected future rent increase.According to Anderson

(2011) and Helsley (1989), the location o f land has no influence on the first two components.

P d™l°'*d(t,z) =

r

+

C

+ ( - ) ( t ) ( z ( t ) - z ] H h r ■ (1.1)
r_L________ / t r Jt________________^

Capitalized
°f
value o f
capital
annual
improvement
agricultural (? o s ' ° f
rent
development)

Valueof accessibility

Valueo f expected
future rent increase

Where
A :Agricultural land rent
r : Discount rate
c :Value o f capital improvement
T .Cost o f commuting a unit o f distance
L : Mean lot size
z : Boundary o f urban area
Ru :Rent on the agricultural land
t .Time o f development

The value o f agricultural land can be deduced from the above form ula as follows:
P°gric{ t , z ) =

r
Capitalized
value o f
annuaI
agricultural
rent

+ ( - ) / ” * > , z ) e - r^ ' \ d t (1.2)
xr Jt________________ #
Value o f expected
future rent increase
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To simplify the above formula, i.e. if the value o f expected future rents to agricultural land is
A
ignored, the rent o f an agricultural land would be only — . In current use property taxations,
r
land values are assessed with the assumption that the land would remain in the current
agricultural (or forestry) use in perpetuity. Therefore, the value o f expected future rent
increases are ignored in CU property tax calculations and the assessed value o f agricultural
land can be written as follows:
oo

j

V(/) = A (u)e-r(u-°du
o

(1.3)

In the presence o f property taxes, income potential o f land as shown in (1.3) will be further
discounted with the rate of property taxes. By incorporating property tax rates, equation 1.3
can further simplify to equation 1.4:
oo

j

V(t) = A(u)e-(r+TXu~0du

(1.4)

o

where V(t) is the value o f property at time t, assuming net revenue stream is generated by the
highest and best use o f land. If land is enrolled in the CU program, the above stream of
income is considered at perpetuity. Hence, the above 1.4 formula can be simplified as:
oo

f

Vcc/= A(u)e~(r+T)vdu

(1.5)

0

A
where Vcu is approximated (Anderson, 2011). as: ------------(r + r)

(1.6)

Therefore, the discount rate applicable in assessing income potential o f land enrolled
in the CU program should consider both interest and property tax rates. See table 1.2 for
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details on how some states have determined the discount rate to assess properties enrolled in
the CU program. As shown, federal land bank (FLB) loan rates and farm credit service (FCS)
interest rates have been largely used in determining discount rates. However, it should be
noted that not all states use FCS or FLB interest rates to determine discount rates. A detailed
description o f discount rate calculation is given in the next sub-section on CU valuation
procedure in practice.
Not all states follow the suggested CU assessment formula in equation 1.6. I provide
an example from Virginia’s CU assessment procedure to understand the CU assessment
components as suggested in equation 1.6 and CU literature. The components o f assessment
reviewed in this section include net farm income, interest rate (discount rate), property tax,
risk and soil productivity, as described by Bruce & Groover (2010); assessments done are
r

shown in table 1.3. The focus of this section is to review CU assessment procedure in New
Hampshire with respect to equation 1.6. In the sections to follow, I describe how CU
assessments are done, and suggest avenues to improve and revise agricultural assessments in
New Hampshire.

Net Farm Income; In CU valuation o f agricultural land, the determination o f income
from land is important. In equation 1.6, farming income is captured by A. When considering
farming incomes, it is recommended to use a moving average o f three to five years to
calculate the average farm income per year. Averaging o f farming income for different
agricultural activities will help account for any income fluctuations due to weather or any
disturbances due to market outcomes. According to the cooperative extension at the
University o f New Hampshire (UNH), agricultural use value assessments for the years 2006-
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2011 are calculated based on the annual net returns to New Hampshire farmland for hay, com
and corn silage. Farmer surveys conducted in the spring o f 2006 have been the source for
farm budgets’ information, and National Agricultural Statistical Service (NASS) agricultural
price reports have been used to adjust agricultural prices for the years that follow the base
year.
In addition to the calculation o f net farm income in CU assessment, consideration of
the discount rate is important (equation 1.6). The following section provides a discussion on
criteria used by most states to determine the discount rate component in CU assessment.

Interest Rate Component (Discount Rate!: In most states, the interest rate component
o f the capitalization rate is derived using average annual effective interest rates on new loans
under the FCS. According to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Bulletin (Department o f the
Treasury, 1996-2011), these interest rates have been used by other states in computing
special use value o f farm properties. Figure 1.2 shows average FCS rates from 1996-2011 for'
all FCS branches, and figure 1.3 shows actual FCS rates, 3-year averages and 5-year
averages o f FCS rates for CoBank, the FCS branch which serves farm credit services to
Alaska, Connecticut, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont and Washington (Spokane & Springfield
branches).
As shown in table 1.2, in most o f the states, FCS rates used in CU assessment are the
averages o f FCS rates over a couple o f years. Hence, annual or short-term fluctuations are
absorbed in discount rate calculations. According to farmland CU assessment in New
14

Hampshire, the discount rate used during the years 2007-2011 (UNH, cooperative extension,
2012) has been 4% and has not been based on FCS or FLB rates. As shown in figure 1.3,
FCS rates have declined considerably since 2001, and the lowest FCS rates are reported in
2006 in almost all the FCS branches. Since 2006, FCS rates have been on a slow rise. Hence,
the discount rates used in CU assessment in New Hampshire need to be adjusted to account
for such fluctuations.

Property Tax Rate Component: In addition to the FCS component, the property tax
rate also needs to be considered in discount rate calculation (equation 1.6). Figure 1.4 shows
New Hampshire’s county level full value tax rates (FVTR) from 1999-2011. As shown, the
Carroll county FVTRs have been consistently lower by $15-20 than all other counties. As
discussed before, the interest rate component may equal the 3-year or 5-year averages o f FCS
rates. Similarly, the property tax rate component may also equal 3 -year or 5-year averages
obtained from the New Hampshire Department o f Revenue Administration (NHDRA)
equalization reports from 1999-2011. It is not clear whether CU assessment in New
Hampshire uses annual averages o f property tax rates or the property tax rate from each year.
Using 3-year or 5-year averages o f FVTRs would be more pertinent in accounting for short
term fluctuations o f FVTRs.

Risk Component: The risks associated with farming may or may not impact areas
uniformly (Bruce & Groover, 2010). Therefore, in calculating use values, accounting for
risks is important. The risks that are associated with input costs, crop yields and prices are
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adequately accounted for in calculating net return to farming. Consequently, risks associated
with the above are not considered in use value calculation in New Hampshire. Other risks
that need to be accounted for are droughts and floods.

In most states, droughts are not

considered a risk component that could lead to variations in use values across jurisdictions.
The reason for lack o f consideration is, in most cases, drought affects the state’s agriculture
uniformly; therefore, drought impact is uniformly distributed across state. Similarly, droughts
need not be considered in use value calculation in New Hampshire due to relatively
homogenous climate zones across jurisdictions, owing to the size o f the state. However, flood
risks need to be accounted for in use value calculation, because flood risks are mostly related
to land’s location, geography etc. Therefore, flood risks borne by specific jurisdictions in the
state need to be accounted for. When considering New Hampshire, riverine flooding is the
most common disaster in New Hampshire (New. Hampshire Department o f Emergency
Planning, 2012). According to the Natural Hazard Mitigation Plan in 2010, significant
riverine flooding impacts some areas o f the state in fewer than ten-year intervals. Therefore
in use value calculation, the capitalization rate needs to be increased (Virginia Polytechnic
Institute and State University, 2010) for the areas that are prone to flooding. In Virginia, the
risk adjustment is 5%.
National flood insurance (NFIns) statistics from the Federal Emergency Management
Agency is the data source that can be used to determine the jurisdictions with high
occurrences of flooding. NFIns information can be used to adjust capitalization rates for
flood risks. According to NFIns statistics, approximately 3,600 flood insurance claims have
been reported in New Hampshire since 1978, with paid claims totaling about $46,800,000
(see table 1.4). Twenty-six jurisdictions have been identified as high flood insurance claim
16

areas (New Hampshire Department of Emergency Planning, 2012), based on the number of
claims made. Using flood risk statistics in use value calculation would yield more accuarte
assessment for agricultural land.
In addition to the above review on net farm income, discount rates and risk components
in relation to CU assessment in New Hampshire, productivity o f soil is also considered in CU
assessment. In contrast to the land productivity index used in Virginia (see table 1.3), New
Hampshire uses the soil productivity index. The following section describes how the soil
productivity index is incorporated into the assessment o f CU land in New Hampshire.

Soil Productivity Component (Soil Productivity Index): The soil productivity index
(SPI) rating system, developed by USDA soil conservation service (United States
Department of Agriculture, 1993), has been used in CU assessment in New Hampshire. SPI
is a numerical rating o f soil’s relative suitability for growing corn silage and grass legume
hay, the crops selected by agricultural specialists as being the two most representative crops
grown in New Hampshire. Therefore, SPI is calculated based on the soil’s suitability for
growing corn silage and grass legume hay. SPI considers indexes o f soil production (P), cost
o f corrective measures (CM) and cost o f continuing limitations (CL), and SPI can be. written
as follows:
SPI = P - (CM+CL), where P is the index o f production or yield capability, CM is the index
that accounts for costs in corrective measures to overcome soil limitations and CL is the
index o f costs resulting from continued limitations. Final SPI is an average o f SPIs o f com
silage and grass legume hay. In SPI, ranking ranges from 0-100, where 100 is assigned to the
best agricultural soil and an SPI o f 0 is assigned to the worst agricultural soil (United States
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Department o f Agriculture, 1993). The evaluation factors used in potential ratings are slope,
available water holding capacity in the upper 40 inches, depth to bed rock, rock fragments in
the surface layer, water table level, soil permeability and mean annual soil temperature. In
New Hampshire, landowners are required to provide information on SPI if assessments are
needs to be adjusted based on SPI (New Hampshire Department o f Revenue Administration
Current Use Criteria Booklet, 2012). Worksheets on assessing SPI are available to
landowners to determine SPI (United States Department of Agriculture, 1993). According to
USDA Soil Conservation Service, prime farmland in New Hampshire has an SPI range
between 68-100. A sample o f SPI calculation as described by the soil conservation service is
provided in the table 1.5.
The above section provided a discussion on components used in assessing CU value o f
land using Virginia’s assessment as an example that follows Anderson’s '(2011) theoretical
model as shown in equation 1.6. I considered equation 1.6 when identifying the components
that need to be revised in assessing agricultural land in New Hampshire. The following
section provides a discussion on the history o f CU assessment ranges in New Hampshire’s
agricultural and forestry land and the reasons why agricultural land assessment ranges need
to be revised in the near future.
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1.5 Current Use Assessment o f Agricultural and Forestry Land in New
Hampshire

Table 1.6 shows assessment ranges per acre for agricultural land in New Hampshire. As
shown, assessment range for farmland has been consistently $25-425 per acre since 1995.
This suggests the need for revising agricultural assessment ranges in New Hampshire.
Constant assessment ranges can lead to a couple o f drawbacks. Tax assessments need to be
adjusted for inflation, changes in productivity o f land, etc. Productivity may not be consistent
for an extended time, which affects income potential o f land. Therefore, landowners may be
paying more property taxes than they are supposed to over the years. Also, towns may be
losing some potential tax revenue. The methodology outlined in section 1.4 as suggested in
equation 1.6 would be ideal in revising agricultural land assessment in New Hampshire. As
discussed, the New Hampshire CU assessment formula needs to be revised by incorporating
annual averages o f FCS rates and property tax rates, and adjusting assessments with
consideration to risk factors.
According to CU booklets issued by the New Hampshire’s Department o f Revenue
Administration, forestland assessment ranges have been updated at least in four-year
intervals. In New Hampshire, enrolled forestlands are assessed based on whether the
landowner offers a forest management plan (with documented stewardship) or not. As shown
in table 1.6, forestland enrolled with documented stewardship offers the additional incentive
of further reduced assessment ranges. Both ownership categories are divided into three
classifications (four prior to 1999). The classifications are white pine, hardwood (red oak,
sugar maple, yellow birch, white birch, and other less common types o f hardwood) and all
other, which includes Christmas tree farms. The assessment ranges reflect market values o f
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the timber or the product, the land’s capacity to produce wood and other factors that directly
affect harvesting o f timber or products. These other factors may include the presence or
absence o f steep slopes, ravines, boulders, wetlands or other physical characteristics that
influence the costs o f harvesting the product or timber.

The location o f the forestland

(whether it is located on a paved state road etc.) is another factor.

1.6 Conclusions and Suggestions

This chapter provides a brief introduction about land conservation programs in the
U.S., highlights the importance o f the program in conserving land and discusses a theoretical
background on how CU assessments are done. The CU program is one o f the leading land
conservation programs in New Hampshire. The percentage o f agricultural land in the
program is about 30% o f the total land enrolled in the program. Therefore, accurate
assessment of agricultural land is important for landowners as well as for local governments.
According to CU official reports, agricultural assessment values have been consistent for
almost fifteen years. This clearly shows the need to revise agricultural assessment values in
New Hampshire’s CU program.
Following the theoretical model developed by Anderson (2011), an accurate prediction
o f discount rate is important for an accurate calculation o f income potential o f land for CU
calculation. According to CU officials in New Hampshire, this rate has been constant at 4%
over the past few years. Therefore, this chapter provides some suggestions for revising the
methods on calculating discount rates to include in CU assessment in New Hampshire.
Incorporating a multiyear average o f Springfield FCS rates, property tax rates and
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adjustments for flood risks would lead to accurate calculation o f discount rates to be used in
New Hampshire’s CU assessments.
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Table 1.1: Finding a Path to Conserve Land
Do you wish to retain ownership of the land?
Yes

No

Do you wish to protect the land permanently?

Is monetary compensation needed?

If Yes

If Yes....

Conservation restriction

Sale at fair market value1
Donate to a charitable remainder trust2

IfNo....
Deed covenants and restriction

If N o -

License or lease to conservation organization

Lifetime donation of land

Management agreement
Open space tax programs
Do you wish to limit the future use of the
property when you convey title?
If Yes—
Conservation restriction
Deed covenants and restrictions
■

IfN o...
“Free and clear” donation
Bargain sale3
Sale at fair market value

Source: Ward, 2001

1 Selling land to a conservation organization
2 An independently managed account that can provide immediate incom e tax deductions or return an annual
income to the owner for a fixed number o f years or for life
3 A sale to a charitable organization or governmental agency at less than fair market value
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Table 1.2: Capitalization Rate Determination in Current Use Assessment
State

Capitalization Rate

Arizona

Federal Land Bank (FLB) rate + 1.5%

Connecticut*

5 year rolling average (95%) of Farm Credit Service (FCS) rate + state tax
rate

Illinois

5 year average FLB rate

Massachusetts

60 month average of FLB rate

North Dakota

12 year average of St. Paul FLB rate

Oregon

5 year average of FLB rate + effective tax rate

Utah

5 year average of FLB rate

South Carolina

FLB rate + effective local tax rate + risk adjustment (15%) + 0.3% for non
liquidity

Wisconsin

5 year average of loan rate

Wyoming

5 year average of Omaha FLB rate

Sources: Kansas Department o f Revenue, 2002; C onnecticut Farm Bureau, 2005
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Table .1.3: Worksheet for Estimating the Use Value o f Agricultural Land in Prince
Edward County, Virginia
1. Estimated net return per acre

$3.58

2. Capitalization Rate Components
i)
Interest rate component
ii)
Effective tax rate component
iii)
Rate without risk component
iv)
Risk component
v)
Rate with flood risk component

0.0717
0.0042
0.0759 (sum i and ii)
0.0038 (0.05 times iii)
0.0798 (sum iii and iv)

3. Unadjusted use value per acre
a. Without risk
b. With risk

$47.16
$44.86

4. Soil index
Class

Cropland
Acreage

Productivity
Index

Weighted
Average

I

418

1.5

627

II

21,273

1.35

28,719

III

10,617

1

10,617

IV

8,196

0.8

6,557

Total

40,504

46,519

Soil Index Factor

1.149

5. Use value adjusted by land class
With Risk

Land Index4

Without Risk

I

1.31

$61.7

58.7

II

1.17

$55.1

52.4

III

1.00

$47.1

$44.8

IV

0.69

$32.5

30.9

V

0.52

$24.5

23.3

Class

Source: Bruce & Groover, 2010

4 Land Index = Productivity Index/Soil Index Factor
5 For additional estimates visit http://usevaIue.agecon.vt.edu/
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Table 1.4: Flood Insurance Claims in New Hampshire at County Level

Belknap

Total Losses*
Reported by NFIP6
(1978-2012)
106

Carroll

250

1,814,998

Cheshire

216

5,317,836

Coos

71

410,854

Grafton

296

3,681,956

Hillsborough

571

9,686,358

Merrimack

286

. 6,204,004

Rockingham

1652

16,083,188

Strafford

128

2,211,261

Sullivan

37

300,837

County

Total Amount Paid
(1978-2012)
889,554

* Includes all losses regardless o f whether losses have been fully paid, not fully paid or
closed without payment.
Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2012

6 NFIP: National Flood Insurance Program
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Table 1.5: Soil Potential Index (SPI) Calculation in New Hampshire
Soil Type: Charlton Fine Sandy Loam, 3 to 8 Percent Slopes, Very Stony7
Grass Legume Hay

Com Silage
Corrective
Measure (CM)

Continuing
Limitation (CL)

Corrective
Measure (CM)

Continuing
Limitation (CL)

Water table greater than 6'

0

0

0

0

Slope range 3 to 8 percent

2

1

0

0

Bedrock greater than 6'

0

0

0

0

Available water capacity: 4.8"

0

0

0

0

Stones cover 1 to 3 percent of the surface

18

5

18

2

Soil permeability 0.6 - 6.0 in/hr

0

0

0

0

Mean annual soil temperature greater than 47 F.

0

0

0

0

20

6

18

2

-

'

CDr_ 1 0 0 -(2 0 + 6) + 100-(18 + 2) _ 74 + 80 nn
1 —-------------------------------------- —
—II

1 Worksheets required in determining ranking for different soil characteristics can be obtained from the Soil Conservation Service, N ew Hampshire
Department o f Agriculture

Table 1.6: Current Use Land Assessment Ranges (Per Acre) in New Hampshire
Y ear

Farm land

F orestland w ith docum ented stew ardship

W hite
P ine

H ardw ood

All
other

F orestland w ithout docum ented stew ardship

W hite
Pine

H ardw ood

A ll other

$85-128

$43-65

U nproductive
including
w etland

1995

$25-425

$46-90

$15-27

$30-66

N aturally
seeded
C hristm as
trees
$50-75

$68-104

N aturally
seeded
C hristm as
trees
$50-75

$15

1996

$25-425

$46-90

$15-27

$30-66

$50-75

$85-128

$43-65

$68-104

$50-75

$15

1997

$25-425

$46-90

$15-27

$30-66

$50-75

$85-128

$43-65

$68-104

$50-75

$15

1998

$25-425

$46-90

$15-27

$30-66

$50-75

$85-128

$43-65

$68-104

$50-75

$15

1999

$25-425

$55-103

$15-33

$40-81

$40-81

$93-141

$47-72

$78-119

$78-119

$15

2000

$25-425

$55-103

$15-33

$40-81

$40-81

$100-152

$51-78

$82-125

$82-125

$15

2001

$25-425

$63-115

$15-36

$44-87

$44-87

$112-170

$55-84

$91-137

$91-137

$15

2002

$25-425

$63-115

$15-36

$44-87

$44-87

$112-170

$55-84

$91-137

$91-137

$15

2003

$25-425

$63-115

$15-36

$44-87

$44-87

$112-170

$55-84

$91-137

$91-137

$15

2004

$25-425

$63-115

$15-36

$44-87

$44-87

$112-170

$55-84

$91-137

$91-137

$15

2005

$25-425

$73-130

$15-44

$49-94

$49-94

$126-191

$62-94

$99-150

$99-150

$15

2006

$25-425

$73-130

$15-44

$49-94

$49-94

$126-191

$62-94

$99-150

$99-150

$15

2007

$25-425

$73-130

$15-44

$49-94

$49-94

$126-191

$62-94

$99-150

$99-150

$15

2008

$25-425

$73-130

$15-44

$49-94

$49-94

$126-191

$62-94

$99-150

$99-150

$15

2009

$25-425

$86-130

$20-34

$49-74

$49-74

$128-192

$57-86

$86-129

$86-129

2010

$25-425

$97-146

$20-36

$43-64

$43-64

$138-207

$55-82

$76-114

$76-114

$20

2011

$25-425

$97-146

$20-36

$43-64

$43-64

$138-207

$55-82

$76-114

$76-114

$20

2012

$25-425

$91-137

$31-46

$22-34

$22-34

$125-188

$57-85

$47-71

$47-71

$20

Source: New Hampshire Current Use Criteria Booklets (New Hampshire Department o f Revenue Administration, 1995-2012)

Figure 1.1: Transfer of Development Rights

Development
Rights
Preservation Zone

Growth Zone

__

Financial
Compensation
Sending Area

Receiving Area

Source: Platt, 1996
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Figure 1.2: Farm Credit Service (FCS) Interest Rates 1996 -2 0 1 1 by District
FCS Rates 1996 -2011
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Source: Internal Revenue Bulletins 1996-2011, IRS
Columbia (AgFirst, FCB) - Delaware, District o f Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland,
North Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia
Sacramento (U.S. Agbank, FCB) - Arizona, California, Hawaii, Kansas, New Mexico,
Nevada, Oklahoma, Utah
St. Paul (AgriBank, FCB) - Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, North Dakota, Ohio, Tennessee, Wisconsin
Omaha (AgriBank, FCB) - Iowa, Nebraska, South Dakota, Wyoming
Spokane (CoBank, FCB) - Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Washington
Springfield (CoBank, FCB) - Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont
Texas, FCB - Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas
Wichita (U.S.Agbank, FCB) - Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma
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Figure 1.3: Springfield District Farm Credit Service (FCS) Interest Rates 1993 2011
FCS Rate -Springfield District 1993 -2011
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Source: Internal Revenue Bulletin, Department o f Treasury, Internal Revenue Services,
Issues 1996-2011
*These interest rates are for Farm Credit District Springfield, MA (CoBank, ACB).
Served states are Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
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Figure 1.4: County Level Full Value Tax Rates* in New Hampshire 1999 - 2011
County Level FVTR 1999-2011
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* Full value tax rates are per $1000 value.
Source: New Hampshire Department o f Revenue Administration
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C hapter 2

2
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2.1 In trod u ction

In 1973, the New Hampshire General Court enacted the current use (CU) law, known
as RSA 79-A (New Hampshire’s Current Use Coalition, 2007) in response to the
campaigning done by the New Hampshire’s CU coaltion, officially known as the
Statewide Program o f Action to Conserve our Environment (SPACE). Since then, the CU
program in New Hampshire is considered to be the cornerstone o f the state’s
conservation efforts, and nearly 3 million acres (about 50 percent o f New Hampshire’s
land) are enrolled in the New Hampshire CU program (see table 2.1). The CU program in
New Hampshire can be considered one o f the state programs that incorporate some o f the
better land-conserving design features (New Hampshire’s Current Use Coaltion, 2007).
CU assessment programs have led to many studies on the subject, ranging from
theoretical models to empirical studies. Most empirical studies on CU programs generally
agree that such programs provide a substantial tax relief to participating landowners
(Brockett, Gottfried & Evans, 2003; Malme, 1993; Polyakov & Zhang, 2008). Despite
the benefits gained by participating landowners, CU programs are often criticized. The
most cited criticism regards the opportunity gained, by land speculators. According to
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Malme (1993), the penalty for the withdrawal from the CU program is not significant for
major developers. The requirement o f minimum acreage, use o f land for the promised use
for the last five years and binding contracts help to divert such speculators. Another
criticism is the revenue loss for towns. This concern leads to another critique: does this
imply a tax shift to homeowners and business properties? However, the concerns on the
shift o f tax burden or the loss o f revenue are counterbalanced by the requirement o f fewer
public services for undeveloped land areas compared to residential areas and most o f the
commercial lands (American Farmland Trust, 2004). Some studies show evidence that
casts doubt upon the success o f the program in preserving undeveloped land (Brockett,
Gottfried & Evans, 2003; Parks & Quimio, 1996; William, Gottfried, Brockett & Evans,
2004). According to Brockett et. al. (2003), the reasons for ineffective land conservation
outcomes include development considerations that overpower the incentives provided by
the program and lenient CU withdrawal penalties.
Despite the aforementioned arguments against the program, there are theoretical
models that predict favorable outcomes from the program and have identified several
testable implications (Anderson & Grififlng, 2000; Capozza & Helsley, 1989; England &
Mohr, 2003). However, empirical studies that verify the theoretical claims o f these
models are limited in number. New Hampshire’s CU program is used as a case study to
verify some theoretical claims contained in earlier studies by the authors referenced
above.
Figure 2.1 shows the distribution o f forest and agricultural land enrolled in the
program in 2009. As shown, about 60-70 percent o f land enrolled in the NH program is
forested land, whereas about 30 percent o f land is agricultural land. Most o f the farmland
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enrollment in the program can be found closer to the Seacoast, the Merrimack River
Valley and the Connecticut River Valley (Vermont and M assachusetts borders). This
specific distribution o f agricultural land enrollment in the CU program is worth exploring
further. Therefore, the first objective o f this chapter is to explore specific determinants o f
CU enrollment and CU withdrawal in New Hampshire over the period 1999-2011. Since
the CU program is considered to be the major land conservation program, I study the
significance o f the CU program in conserving land, using data related to the CU program
in New Hampshire. A drawback o f available data for this chapter is a high percentage o f
missing observations in some variables, which could hinder the reliability o f research
findings. In addition to exploring the characteristics that lead to enrollment in and
withdrawal o f land from the CU program, this paper also focuses on some o f the well
known missing data statistical techniques. The missing data treatment methods compared
are simple deletion, mean imputation and multiple imputation techniques. Hence, the
second objective o f this paper is to compare existing missing data treatment techniques
and carry out the New Hampshire case study analysis.
This chapter is organized as follows. First, the theoretical models and hypotheses are
summarized. The next section describes data, methodology and model specifications.
Then I discuss the multiple imputations technique I used to treat missing data in the New
Hampshire case study. Then I present results obtained using panel data analysis. The
chapter concludes with a summary o f key findings and a discussion on possible
suggestions for successful implementation o f the CU program in New Hampshire.
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2.2 Conceptual Models Used for the Analysis and Hypotheses
This section summarizes the theoretical models used to generate predictions about
CU programs.

The models include the effects o f Central Business Districts (CBD),

property tax rates, withdrawal penalty and population growth on land values. The value
of land is determined by four distinct components (Anderson, 1986; Capozza & Helsley,
1989). The first component is the value o f accessibility, which depends on the
transportation cost and the distance to the CBD. Close proximity to the CBD and
accessibility increase land value (see figure 2.3). It is assumed that access to the CBD is
no longer relevant at distances greater than Z*. The second component o f land value is
the conversion value. The presence o f conversion value corresponds to a considerable
value hike in lands located within a certain distance from (Z*) CBD. The third
component o f land value is the anticipated value o f future rent increase. This expected
rent increase depends on the distance to the CBD. It is assumed that the expected future
rent increases are higher at the urban fringe.
The fourth and final component o f land value is the CU value, which does not
depend on the distance to the CBD.

When we take these four components into

consideration, it is clear that land prices decline with increases in distance to CBD.
Therefore, the land parcels at the urban fringe face higher real estate market values and as
a result, higher property taxes. Hence, landowners with agricultural or forestland at the
urban fringe are more inclined to enroll in the CU program. The two business districts
considered for empirical analysis for this study are Boston, MA and Manchester, NH.
Following the land-value models proposed in the literature, this paper hypothesizes a
higher proportion of CU enrollment and lower CU withdrawal in towns closer to Boston
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and Manchester, as opposed to towns located away from the above two cities. When
consider the effect o f population growth on rural land development, I hypothesize a
decline in the acres o f land enrolled in the CU program with higher growth in population.
There are three possibilities when the effect o f change in population on land allocation is
considered. First, new populations may settle in a land that is already developed, thereby
increasing urban density. Second, the new population may settle on undeveloped land
that is enrolled in the CU program or, third, on land that is not enrolled in the program
(see figure 2.4). Therefore, changes in land enrollment in the CU program due to changes
in population may be hard to capture with simple population statistics. However, I test the
hypothesis that an increase in population results in a decline in land enrolled in the CU
program and higher withdrawal from the program. I assume if there is a higher growth
rate in population, then there is a decline in the acres o f land enrolled in the CU program
to accommodate the increased population.
The theoretical model developed by England & Mohr (2003) implies some important
testable predictions about CU assessment.

Their inter-temporal model o f land

development includes features specific to the CU program. Following England & Mohr
(2003), this paper hypothesizes higher CU enrollment and lower CU withdrawal in towns
with higher property tax rates and higher average land value. According to the model, a
landowner decides the timing o f development (D ), considering the pecuniary benefits
before/after the development (c and u) and non-pecuniary benefits (n) only before the
development. Therefore, the owner chooses a time to develop the land when the present
value o f her income stream is maximized. The model is:
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is the property tax rate, r is the owner’s discount rate, P is the

penalty fee and t denotes time. Following England & Mohr (2003) model predictions, 1
hypothesize an increase in land enrollment for the program with higher r and higher
aerage land value (ALV). I use the term full value tax rate (FVTR) to denote the x o f
England & Mohr (2003) model. ALVjt in town is calculated as follows:
Residential land value + Commercial and Industrial land value
ALVit = --------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total land - Non taxable conservation and C U land

This chapter also focuses on exploring the influence o f daily traffic in a town on
CU enrollment and CU withdrawal, hence development pressure. According to Ni et al.
(2005) and Nordback et al. (2011), federal transportation funds are linked to vehicle
miles travelled (VMT) and are calculated based on annual average daily traffic (AADT).
(Ni, Leonard, Guin, & Feng, 2005; Nordback et al., 2011). With higher volumes in
AADT, the flow o f federal funding may increase the development pressure in town,
resulting in lower CU enrollment and higher CU withdrawal.
Monetary benefits landowners receive by enrolling their land in the CU program
in New Hampshire are promising. However, if a landowner decides to withdraw land
from the CU program, a withdrawal penalty, known as land use change tax (LUCT) is
imposed in New Hampshire. LUCT in New Hampshire is calculated based on the market
value o f land at the time o f sale. Although, LUCT is not used as a variable in this chapter,
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LUCT and land withdrawal data indicate a disturbing problem - the missing data issue. In
addition, some AADT were also missing due to the nature o f data collection. In the
section 2.4.1 a detailed explanation is presented on the above missing data. The values
that are missing from AADT, LUCT and land withdrawn could not be ignored in the
analysis. In treating missing data, I compared three missing data treatment techniques simple deletion, mean imputation and multiple imputations, which are described in the
following section.

2.3 Comparison o f Missing Data Treatment Methods
Many techniques have been developed in the past as a solution for the missing data
issue (Carter, 2006). However, researchers often use ad-hoc approaches (Honaker &
King, 2010; Wayman, 2003) in handling missing data, which may ultimately do more
harm than good. The approaches may include simple listwise deletion, mean substitution,
and missing data imputation etc. Researchers agree about strengths and weaknesses o f
each method.
Listwise deletion or complete case analysis is the deletion o f observations that have
missing values on one or more o f the variables in the data set. This means that the
researcher removes all the records that have missing data on any variable. Listwise
deletion is the default in most statistical software, but it may lead to significant sample
size reduction available for the analysis depending on the proportion o f discarded cases.
If the discarded cases represent only a small proportion o f the entire data set, then listwise
deletion may be a reasonable approach (Honaker & King, 2010; Wayman, 2003). In
listwise deletion, missing data are treated as missing completely at random. However, if
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the proportion o f missing data increases and discarded cases differ systematically from
the rest (data not missing completely at random), then listwise deletion may add serious
bias towards estimates.
In some cases, the missing observations are replaced by an average o f the variable;
this process is known as mean imputation or mean substitution. Although this is
considered to be a mean preserving method, it affects the marginal distribution o f data.
All the above methods do not eliminate the possibility o f biased results (Philips & Chen,
2011). Although mean substitution approach preserves the marginal distribution o f the
variable, it affects the covariance and correlations between variables (Cameron &
Trivedi, 2005).

2.3.1

Multiple Imputation

In 1987, Rubin proposed a multiple imputations scheme to treat missing data.
Multiple imputation (MI) method has been widely used over the past by researchers in
many study areas (Norman, 2009; Phillips & Chen, 2011; Kammerer, 2009; Siche et al,
2008). The first stage is the creation o f set copies with the original data set and the
generation o f missing values using an appropriate modeling procedure. Then, any
standard analysis can be performed with the new imputed data set.
According Rubin (1987), multiple imputations have several desirable features. Such
features include its usability in any kind o f analysis without specialized software, its yield
o f unbiased estimates, and the possibility o f obtaining accurate estimates for standard
errors etc. The literature with formal recommendations for the number o f imputations is
very minimal. It is often cited that 3 to 10 multiple imputations are enough to obtain
valid inferences (Kammerer, 2009; Royston, Carlin, & White, 2009; Rubin, 1987, 1996).
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According to Rubin (1987), the efficiency o f an estimate based on m imputations is given

where y represents the rate o f missing information. Accordingly, the

by
V

efficiencies achieved for various values o f m and rates o f missing information are shown
in table 2.1. As shown, if the rate o f missing information is very high, increasing the
number of imputations will increase the efficiency o f estimates. However, if the rate of
missing information is lower (10%), then the gain is minimal with higher number o f
imputations.

In MI, each set o f imputations creates a complete data set. The first step o f the MI
method is to estimate multiple values for each missing datum. This simulates multiple
random draws from the data in order to estimate the unknown parameter. Then, each o f
the data set can be analyzed using standard complete data analysis (Schreuder & Reich,
1998). Multiple imputations include multiple copies o f original data and imputations o f
missing values as required by the researcher (Carlin, Galati, & Royston, 2008).
Accordingly, this method has three general stages (Rubin, 1996). In the first and second
steps, missing values are replaced with a set o f multiple plausible values and then
analyses are performed on each imputed data set. In the last step, results obtained from
multiple data sets are consolidated to get final estimates. Figure 2.5 shows the above
three steps o f the multiple imputation process.
Multiple imputations can be performed without a model or can be based on a model
determined by the researcher (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). In the regression based model
approach, multiple imputations are done through a process o f iterations. That is, missing
values are iteratively generated based on the observed variables (Carlin et al., 2008).
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2.4 Data and Methodology
This chapter evaluates the significance o f the CU program in conserving land in New
Hampshire by considering the effect o f population change, the distance to two central
business districts (CBDs), the average value o f residential land (ALV), and the full value
tax rates (FVTR) on the proportions o f land enrolled and withdrawn in the New
Hampshire CU program. In addition, this chapter compares different missing data
treatment techniques.
The New Hampshire Department o f Revenue Administration (NHDRA) maintains
comprehensive information on CU taxation at the town level. After eliminating some
possible outlier towns8, 231 towns were considered for this analysis. The towns not
included for the analysis are New Castle, Hart's Location and Newfields. The data
required to determine CU program success are from NHDRA annual reports and CU
reports from 1999-2011. NH population statistics are from the U.S. Census. The
economic and developmental influences emanating from Boston are considerable for
most o f the New Hampshire towns, especially in the Southern portion o f the state.
Therefore, this study considers Boston as one o f the Central Business Districts in the
analysis, in addition to Manchester, which is the largest city in New Hampshire. The
distance to each business district from each town is from Google map data9. Easy access
to cities helps us to understand the development pressure for towns. Average Annual
Daily Traffic (AADT) data are used to assess development pressures and AADT data
were obtained from the New Hampshire Department o f Transportation (DOT) traffic data

8 With very high land values

9 www.maps.google.com
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for the years 1999-2011. AADT data used in this study are averages o f traffic data
collected from roads classified as collectors and arterials by New Hampshire DOT.
According to Berry (1993), most o f the land withdrawn from the CU program in New
Hampshire has been converted to residential land as opposed to commercial land.
Average value o f land could be a considerable determinant in enrolling land in the CU
program (England & Mohr, 2003). Therefore, this study uses average value o f land as a
determinant in enrolling land in the CU program.

2.4.1

Missing Data Treatment

This paper focuses on the missing data issue in the dataset before proceeding to
detailed analyses. In the NH dataset, only 70 percent o f the observations reported
contained no missing data, whereas about 30 percent o f observations had at least one
missing value. Most o f the missing data were found in the variables CU acres removed
and AADT in towns. According to New Hampshire CU law, lands withdrawn from the
program are subjected to a penalty o f 10 percent o f market value; this is known as Land
Use Change Tax (LUCT). Therefore, the CU acres removed and LUCT both should have
been reported for any observation, if any land is withdrawn from the CU program. Most
notably, AADT data were missing from certain years. Cases o f missing data for those two
variables were easily observable. A method to replace those missing values was
important.
Missing data treatment techniques used are complete case analysis, mean substitution
and multiple imputations. In the complete case method, observations with at least one
missing value were dropped from the analysis. In mean substitution, mean values o f
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variables were used to replace missing values (Osborne, 2013). Multiple imputations of
this chapter were done using STATA’s chained equations with commands ice and mim.
The ice command creates the desired number o f data sets and performs analyses across
created data sets, which are followed by the pooling o f estimates to derive final estimates.
Missing data treatment analysis in this chapter is done in two steps. First, 1 use a sub
set of original data containing variables with no missing values to compare the three
missing data treatment techniques to find out the best method to treat missing data in the
original data set. Second, missing data in the original data set is treated with the
recommended technique from the first step. More details on the two steps o f the missing
data analysis are given below.
In the first step, the chosen variables with no missing values are full value tax rate
-(FVTR), average value o f residential land (ALV), population change and distances to two
central business districts in .the study. In order to understand which method is more
appropriate to treat missing values, I compared results generated from the sub-set o f data
with no missing values to the sub-set o f data with artificially created missing
observations. For this analysis, missing values for FVTR, ALV and population change
were randomly inserted at missing rates o f 5, 10 and 15 percent. Analyses were done
using random effect panel data technique. All missing data treatments were compared to
the results o f the sub-set of data with no missing values. Multiple imputation technique
was proven to be more effective in generating similar results to the results obtained from
the sub-set o f data with no missing values. Based on the results from the first step, the
final analysis was performed after treating original data with three multiple imputations
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(Carlin et al., 2008; Philips & Chen, 2011; Rubin, 1996). The models used in the analyses
are described in the following section.

2.4.2

Model Specifications and Panel Data Analysis
In determining the factors that could influence landowners’ decision to enroll and

withdraw land from the CU program in New Hampshire, I estimate the following model:

Y ^ f ( X ^ iX f BD) + ell

( 2 .2 )

In this model Yit represents proportion o f farmland or forestland (compared to total
land), percentage o f CU land enrolled in the New Hampshire CU program or CU land
withdrawn from the program at town level; Xf, is a vector o f time dependent variables
that might influence CU enrollment, CU withdrawal or land conservation. The variables
considered are FVTR, ALV, population change (for 1,000) in' each year, average annual
daily traffic data (AADT), tax savings on CU land and percentage o f CU acres receiving
further tax reduction due to permitted recreational activities. The vector X f BDcontains
two dummy variables - identifying towns located within 50 miles from Boston, MA and
Manchester, NH.
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2.5 Results and Discussion
In this study I was particularly interested in comparing some o f the existing
missing data treatment methods and in understanding land conservation efforts in New
Hampshire in relation to the CU property taxation program. This section first presents
the summary statistics o f original data and then the results o f missing data treatment
comparison on the sub-set o f data. Finally, discusses the results o f the random effect
panel data models o f original CU data treated with 3 multiple imputations.
In New Hampshire, property taxes contribute to a larger share o f state and local
government tax revenue than in most other states. Hence, higher property taxes could be
a burden for agricultural and forestry landowners if the income from land is not enough
to cover property tax bills. Therefore, most landowners with undeveloped land are
inclined to seek property tax relief. Since the initiation o f the CU program, about 50% o f
land in New Hampshire has been consistently enrolled in the program in each year. Table
2.2 shows the percentage o f land enrolled in the CU program in New Hampshire from
1999-2011. As shown in table 2.3, the average FVTR for the study period is $18.5 for
$1000 o f estimated market value.

The FVTR are calculated using mill rates and

equalization ratio. The equalization ratio is the percentage ratio o f the total assessed
values to the total market values o f municipality’s properties. An equalization ratio of
100 implies that a town is assessing properties at 100 % o f market value, and that, most

likely, reassessments are done every year. An equalization rate less than 100 means
properties in a town are assessed less than the market value. However if the equalization
rate is greater than 100 , properties in the town are assessed, on average, higher than
market value for property tax purposes. According to New York State’s Department o f

Taxation and Finance (2013), this could be due to property value decrease since the last
reassessment or due to not adjusting assessment values downward. In New Hampshire
towns, the average equalization rate is 90.6 with a minimum o f 35 and a maximum o f
143. An equalization rate of 90.6 means that, on average, property taxes are calculated
based on 90.6% o f property’s market value.
The percentage o f missing values in variables o f interest is given in table 2.4. As
shown, the highest missing values are reported in AADT, CU acres removed and LUCT
(30%). To avoid any possibilities o f bias due to missing data, the original data needed to
be treated with some missing data technique. In order to compare the three missing data
treatment techniques, a sub-set o f original data variables with no missing data (NMIS)
was chosen, and regression results were compared with randomly assigned missing
values at rates o f 5, 10 and 15%. Table 2.5 shows the results o f missing data treatments.
The results o f the three methods are compared with the regression results o f NMIS data/
As shown in table 2.5 when the rate o f missing data is 5%, regression results from
all missing data treatments are much similar to the results reported with no missing
values. More precisely, complete case results are closely comparable. However, when the
rate o f missing data is 10%, estimates obtained from data treated with complete case
analysis and mean substitution deviate considerably from estimates with no missing
values. However, estimates obtained after treating data with multiple imputation shows
closely comparable estimates to estimates from NMIS data. Also, results show much
closer estimates from 3, 5 and 8 imputations. When the rate o f missing values increases
to 15%, estimates generated from mean substitution and complete case analyses are not
close to the estimates from NMIS data as in the case with 10% missing values. However,
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estimates obtained from 3 and 5 imputations provide promising results (see table 2.6).
Compared to mean substitution and complete case analyses, results reported o f data
treated with multiple imputations have maintained the consistency o f estimates regardless
o f the percentage missing. As suggested by Rubin (1987), my results show that marginal
efficiency gain is lower by higher imputations compared to fewer imputations (see table
2 . 2 ).

In the CU data, about 12 percent o f data were missing for the variables chosen for
further analysis. With the missing data treatment results, 3 and 5 multiple imputations
with 15% missing values generated closely comparable results compared to NMIS data
set. Therefore, analyses done with the original CU data were restricted to 3 imputations,
considering the comparable results and less marginal gain that could yield with higher
imputations.
According to the theoretical predictions in the CU literature, I hypothesized an
increase in CU enrollment (overall, farm or forest) with higher FVTR, higher AADT (due
to development pressure), higher average land value and in towns located within 50 miles
of Boston or Manchester. Also I assumed an increase in CU enrollment with further tax
reductions given for agreeing to provide recreational adjustment and a decrease in CU
enrollment with increases in population and tax on CU land (due to high assessment o f
CU land). Models 1-3 consider the total CU land percentage, the farmland CU land
percentage and the forestland CU land percentage as dependent variables.
Table 2.7 shows the results o f random effect panel data regression models on
original data. As expected, towns with higher FVTR tend to have a significant increase in
percentage o f land enrolled in the CU program. Similarly, a higher percentage o f
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forestlands is also enrolled in the program in towns with higher FVTR (model 3).
However, the FVTR estimate does not support the hypothesis when considering the
percentage o f farmland enrolled in the program (model 2). However, the above result is
not statistically significant. As expected, a higher percentage o f farmland is enrolled in
the program in towns closer to Boston and Manchester. Hence, farmland owners at the
urban fringe are most likely inclined to get the tax relief from CU enrollment. However,
the influence o f two CBDs does not support the hypothesis when considering forestland
and overall CU land percentage in the program.

As expected, higher ALV leads to a

significant increase in CU enrollment (models 1 and 3).
When considering the population growth, this study suggests a decrease in overall
CU land enrolled in the program when there is an increase in population. Also, the results
suggest an increase in CU enrollment if CU lands are allowed to receive additional tax
deductions if recreation is permitted for the public.

As expected, towns with higher

development pressure (denoted from AADT) have a higher percentage o f farmland
enrolled in the CU program (see table 2.7, models 1-3).

As discussed before, CU

taxation depends on income potential o f land. Hence, accurate assessment o f CU land is
important. As shown in model 1-3, if property taxes on CU land are higher (i.e. if CU
assessments are higher), then this could lead to decreases in CU enrollment.
This paper also analyzes the factors that could lead to CU withdrawal. As
hypothesized, if towns are closer to Boston or Manchester, CU withdrawal will be lower
(model 4). As expected, withdrawal o f CU land will be higher if growth in population is
higher. However, it is not significant. To capture the effect o f population growth on CU
land proportion in the program may be difficult, because new populations may not
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necessarily settle only on CU land. Rather, they may be settling in already developed land
or in lands that are not entitled for preferential tax benefits (see figure 2.4).

2.6 Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research
In New Hampshire, the CU program is considered the corner stone in conserving
undeveloped land from being developed for urbanized uses, such as commercial or
residential development. Having about 50% o f New Hampshire land enrolled in the CU
program shows the importance o f the program in New Hampshire. This chapter focuses
on finding the factors that determine the performance o f the CU program in New
Hampshire using data from 1999-2011 is used for analyses.
In addition, this chapter also focuses on missing data issue in research. As
suggested in past literature, ignoring missing data could lead to serious bias in research
results. Therefore, three missing data treatment methods were compared to determine the
most appropriate missing data treatment method for the data used in this study. Compared
methods are complete case analysis (listwise deletion), mean substitution and multiple
imputations. Results from missing data treatment suggest a couple o f important
outcomes. According to the results, if the percentage o f missing data is low, then bias that
results from missing data is low. Hence, all three methods generate almost similar results.
However, as the percentage o f missing values increases, then the three methods used to
treat missing data in this study generate considerably different estimates. Hence, if the
missing value percentage is high, results o f this paper suggest a lower number o f multiple
imputations (3-5) are more appropriate to treat missing data compared to other methods.
Therefore, missing data in the study were treated with 3 imputations for further analyses.

The CU program objective is to slow land development via providing tax relief
for landowners if they promise to keep undeveloped land without converting it for more
urbanized uses. This chapter focused on verifying how some factors could support the
conservation o f land in New Hampshire. CU information and related data for 231 towns
for the period 1999-2011 were used for analyses. According to the results, property tax
rates (FVTR) and average land value (ALV) o f a town have played major roles in
landowners’ decision to-enroll land in the CU program. Also the results suggest higher
land enrollment in towns with higher FVTR and higher ALV. Which suggest possible tax
savings from the programs play an important role in enrolling land in the program.
Following theoretical models, this paper also hypothesized an increase in CU enrollment
if towns are located closer to central business districts (CBDs). However, this paper does
not support the above hypothesis. Above theoretical claim about the influence o f CBDs is
supported when considering the CU withdrawal model and suggests CU withdrawal is
lower if a town is located closer to one o f the CBDs considered in the study.
In New Hampshire, most farmlands are located closer to the Seacoast, the
Merrimack River Valley and the Connecticut River Valley (Massachusetts and Vermont
borders), whereas forestlands are in the rest o f the state. Therefore, theoretical model
predictions o f landowners’ behavior in enrolling land may be subjected to geographical
distribution o f farmland and forestland in New Hampshire (see figure 2.1) and need to be
accounted for in further research work.
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Tables
Table 2.1: Efficiencies Achieved for Various Values o f m

r
m

0.1

0.3

0.5

3

97

91

86

5

98

94

91

10

99

97

95

100

99

98

20

.

Table 2.2: C u rre n t Use Acres in New H am pshire
Y ear

CU Acres

1999

2,803,462

CU P ercent o f Total
L and
52.66

2000

2,811,203

52.80

2001

2,806,783

52.72

2002

2,769,443

52.02

2003

2,744,020

51.54

2004

2743,9.71

51.54

2005

2,744,020

51.54

2006

2,720,822

51.11

2007

2,721,722

51.12

2008

2,701,589

50.75

2009

2,718,793

51.07

2010

2,748,535

51.63

2011

2,766,140

51.96
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics on Land Characteristics, Property Taxes and Other Socio Economic Variables
Unit of Measurement

Mean

Std.Dev.

Min

Max

CU land

#of
Obs.
3003

Percentage of total land

0.505

0.214

0.005

0.998

Farm land

3003

Percentage of total land

8.667

10.715

0

100

Farm CU

3003

Percentage of CU land

4.682

4.948

0

59.297

Forest land

2999

Percentage of total land

54.944

30.198

0

100

Forest CU

2999

Percentage of CU land

32.542

17.824

0

159.396

CU removed

2172

Percentage of CU land

1.867

10.654

0

100

CU removed

2172

Acres

119.872

867.725

0.04

14940.6

CU parcel size

2988

Acres

47.814

57.612

4.383

1073.70

FVTR(t)

3003

For $1000 assessed value

18.598

5.172

5.403

41.104

Equalization ratio

2998

Ratio

90.635

15.071

34.8

143

Boston

3003

Miles

99.781

41.675

33.9

218

Manchester

3003

Miles

57.67

35.663

0

167

Residential

3003

Dollars per acre

9678.78

15763.0

77.351

132497

Commercial

2858

Dollars per acre

1872.54

5002.89

0.086

42301.0

Current Use

3003

Dollars per acre

107.06

50.601

5.457

1365.30

Population Change

3003

Per 1000

11.367

38.776

-259.18

689.076

Average annual daily traffic
(AADT)

2088

5965.48

5515.63

60

111887

Variable

Land

Property Tax

Distance

Land Value

Table 2.4: Percentage o f Missing Data
Number
Missing
0

Percentage
Missing
0

Farm CU percent o f total land

0

0

Forest CU percent o f total land

4

0.1

CU removed

831

27.7

Land use change tax (LUCT)

853

28.4

Total CU parcels

15

0.5

Average parcel size

15

Full Value Tax Rate (FVTR)

0

0

Acres receiving recreational
adjustment
Distance to Boston

159

5.3

0

0

Distance to Manchester

0

0

Average value o f residential land

0

0

Population change

0

0

915

30.5

Variable
CU percent o f total land

Average annual daily traffic (AADT)

53

.

0.5

Table 2.5: Missing Data Treatments Results on the Sub-set of Data with 5% and 10% Missing
5% Missing

10% Missing

Imputations
No
Missing
Data

Comp.
Case

Full Value
Tax Rate

0.132
(0.655)

0.125
0.151
(0.730) (0.595)

Dis.to
Bos<50
miles (D)

-0.210
(0 .000)

-0.207 -0.219 -0.219 -0.219 -0.223 -0.223 -0.203 -0.223 -0.224 -0.224 -0.225 -0.225
( 0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) ( 0 .000) ( 0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000)

Variables

Dis. To
-0.055
Manchester (0.018)
<50 miles
(D)

Mean
Subs.

-0.054 -0.058
( 0 .022) (0.013)

3

0.169
(0.684)

5

Imputations

0.184
(0.614)

-0.056 -0.056
(0.017) (0.016)

8

10

Comp.
Case

Mean
Subs.

0.293
0.407
0.299
0.297
(0.311) (0.279) (0.405) (0.284)

3

5

8

0.236
(0.452)

0.140
0.177
(0.623) (0.524)

10

\
0.265
(0.473)

-0.057 -0.053 -0.059 -0.056
(0.014) (0.026) ( 0 .011) (0.018)

-0.056
(0.018)

-0.058 -0.058
(0.014) (0.014)

-0.025
(0.015)

-0.019 -0.019
(0.067) (0.066)

-0.046 -0.045 -0.143 -0.091 -0.047 -0.051
(0 . 102) (0.154) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0.357) (0.337)

-0.040 -0.041
(0.383) (0.325)

-0.057
(0.014)

Residential
land value
(average)

-0.094
( 0 .000)

-0.100 -0.059 -0.050
( 0 .000) (0 .000) (0.006)

-0.048 -0.032 -0.032 -0.122 -0.043 -0.024
(0, 001) (0.070) (0.051) (0 .000) ( 0 .000) (0.029)

Population
change

-0.090
(0 .000)

-0.094 -0.073 -0.077
(0 .001) (0.003) (0.050)

-0.061
(0.238)

Constant

0.559
( 0 .000)

0.555
0.552
0.554
0.554
0.558
0.557
0.556
0.552
0.557
0.553
0.554
0.554
(0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000)

Table 2.6: Missing Data Treatments Results on the Sub-set of Data with 15% Missing
15% Missing
Imputations
Variables

No Missing
Data

Comp.
Case

Mean Subs.

3

5

8

10

Full Value Tax Rate

0.132
(0.655)

0.934
(0.246)

0.503
(0.151)

0.119
(0.863)

0.115
(0.831)

0.312
(0.544)

0.365
(0.465)

Dis. to Boston <50
miles (D)

-0.210
(0 .000)

-0.041
(0.619)

-0.230
(0 .000)

-0.224
(0 .000)

-0.223
(0 .000)

-0.227
(0 .000)

-0.226
(0 .000)

Dis. to
Manchester<50 miles
(D)

-0.055
(0.018)

0.006
(0.843)

-0.063
( 0 .011)

-0.049
(0.050)

-0.049
(0.051)

-0.056
(0 .020)

-0.057
(0 .020)

Residential Land
Value (Average)

-0.094
(0 .000 )

-0.332
(0.082)

0.042
(0.623)

-0.137
(0.181)

-0.159
(0.130)

-0.086
(0.596)

-0.067
(0.654)

Population Change

-0.090
(0 .000)

-0.109
(0.039)

-0.049
(0.085)

-0.033
(0.416)

-0.039
(0.393)

-0.030
(0.403)

-0.031
(0.348)

Constant

0.559
(0 .000)

0.558
( 0 .000)

0.548
(0 .000)

0.557
(0 .000)

0.558
(0 .000)

0.551
(0 .000)

0.550
(0 .000)

Probability values are given in parenthesis.

‘

Table 2.7: Regression Results after 3 Imputations

Variables
Full Value Tax rate

Model I

Model 2

Model 3

CU Percent of
Total Land
2 433 ***
(0 .000)

Farm CU of
Total Land

Forest CU of CU Removed
Total Land
Percent of

-23.711
(0.144)
0.452
(0.658)
0.754
(0.207)
-0.502**
(0 .021)
1.052
(0.355)
0.040
(0.123)
0.085
(0.770)
0.009
(0.192)

670.697***
(0 .000)
-16.583***
(0 .000)
-2.393
(0.189)
0.058
(0.955)
9.174*
(0.092)
0.310**
(0.005)
0.067
(0.936)
-0.175***
(0 .000)

Distance to Boston < 50 miles (D: Yes =1)

-0.223***
(0 .000)

Distance to Manchester < 50 miles (D: Yes =1)

-0.058**
(0 .012)

Average Land Value

0.028***
(0 .000)

Population Change

-0.003
(0.897)

Acres Receiving Recreational Adjustment

0.001
(0.151)

Average Annual Daily Traffic (AADT)

0.001
(0.585)

Property Tax per Acre of CU Land

-0 .002 ***
(0 .000)

CU Tax Savings per Acre
Constant

0.545***
(0 .000)

4.679***
(0 .000)
Probability values are given in parenthesis. ***P<0.01, **P<0.05, *P<0.1

26.174***
( 0 .000)

Model 4

473.715*
(0.067)
-0.839
(0.796)
-7.655**
(0.014)
-2.246
(0.360)
107.579**
(0.017)
1.826*
(0.064)
0.131
(0.924)
0.184**
(0.003)
0.072
(0.902)
-3.661
(0.206)

Table 2.8: Summarized Hypotheses and Results - Current Use Enrollment
CU Enrollment
Hypothesis

Results
Agree?

CU Withdrawal
Hypothesis

Results
Agree?

Full Value Tax Rate

>0

Yes

<0

No

Located 50 miles from Boston

>0

No

<0

Yes

Located 50 miles from Manchester

>0

No

<0

Yes

Average Land Value

>0

Yes

<0

Yes

Population Change

<0

Yes

>0

Yes

Recreational Adjustment

>0

Yes

<0

No

Average Annual Daily Traffic

>0

Yes

<0

No

Tax on per acre CU land

<0

Yes

>0

Yes
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Figure 2.2: Current Use Land Change (%) in New Hampshire 1999 - 2009
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Figure 2.3: Determinants of Land Value
Land Price
per Acre
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Sources: Anderson (1986) and Cappoza & Helsley (1989)
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Boston

Figure 2.4: Effect of Change in Population on Land Allocation
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Figure 2.5: Multiple Imputation Process
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C h apter 3

3

E v a l u a t io n

of

C u r r e n t U se P r o g r a m F e a t u r e s U sin g D u r a t io n A n a l y s is
and

C o m p e t in g R isk R e g r e s s io n s

3.1 Introd uction

Urbanization and other forms o f development often lead to higher market values
of land. When these higher market values are reflected in increased property tax
obligations, the owners may sell off parcels to cover their property tax bills. Over the past
few decades, all U.S. states have responded to this tax-induced development by
implementing various policies to keep land in its current rural use. The current use (CU)
property taxation program, one o f such preferential taxation systems, has been present in
the U.S. since 1956. CU valuation programs can result in considerable tax savings to
landowners (Butler et al., 2010). In most states, lands utilized for agriculture or forestry
(even open space land in some states) are eligible to receive this tax benefit from the
program. CU programs operate at the state and local levels to provide incentives to
private landowners who wish to keep their rural land intact without residential,
commercial or industrial development.
Maryland was the first state to implement a preferential property taxation system,
primarily due to a rapid increase in farmland price relative to net farm income after
World War II (England, 2011). Thereafter, CU property taxation rapidly spread into other
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regions o f the country. However, CU programs are considerably different across states in
terms o f enrollment requirement, CU assessment methods and penalties on withdrawal.
Most notably, in some states even the preferential taxation program name is different. For
example, the CU program in Pennsylvania is known as Clean and Green program
(Pennsylvania Department o f Agriculture, 2013). Irrespective o f such variations across
programs, all preferential assessment programs provide considerable tax savings to
landowners.
With the sole exception o f Michigan, all other states have implemented some sort
o f CU assessment program during the years between 1956 and 1997. The reasons for
implementation o f the program during these decades have not yet been fully explored. As
stated in chapter 1, there are three types o f CU programs that can be identified as pure
preferential assessment, deferred taxation or CU assessment with restrictive agreements.
In pure preferential assessment, landowners enjoy lower property taxes on enrolled land
in the CU program with no withdrawal penalties if a land is withdrawn, from the program.
In contrast, if a CU program is categorized as deferred taxation, landowners enjoy the
benefit o f lower property taxes while enrolled in the program and face a withdrawal
penalty if a land is withdrawn from the program. Figure 3.1 shows the states with pure
preferential assessment and deferred taxation.
Figure 3.2 shows the categories o f CU withdrawal penalties considered in this
chapter, which are described as the second type o f CU programs in the literature. CU
withdrawal penalties are broadly based on the market value at the time o f withdrawal or
property tax savings received by the landowner after enrolling land in the program. CU
program features vary considerably across states (see table 3.1) in terms o f penalties that
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landowners face for withdrawal o f land from the program. As shown in table 3.1, CU
withdrawal penalties are different depending on whether penalties are based on market
value or roll-back, and the roll-back penalties are vastly different based on the number o f
years o f tax savings collected. Based on differences in CU withdrawal penalties, this
chapter focuses on five categories o f CU withdrawal penalties. The distribution o f
withdrawal penalties is shown in figure 3.2. The two penalties based on market value at
the time o f sale are fixed percentage market value penalty and the sliding scale (declining
percentage) market value penalty that varies with the length o f enrollment time. The three
penalties based on tax savings are the rollback penalties with fixed number o f years,
sliding-scale rollback penalties and rollback penalties that charge an additional interest on
tax savings received.
The third type o f CU program is CU programs with restrictive agreements.
Restrictive agreements refer to contractual obligations a participating landowner would
enter upon enrolling land in the CU program. The contractual agreement usually
obligates a landowner to keep land without developing it for certain number o f years,
usually ten, with the option to renew each year thereafter. If a landowner changes the
land use before the contract matures, more serious penalties are imposed. Therefore, the
distinction between deferred taxation and restrictive agreements is not always clear
(Collins, 1976; Keene, 1976), unless when considering the required length o f enrollment.
Unlike the other two types o f CU programs, restrictive agreements are considered to be
least effective in awarding tax benefits to landowners. The reason is many owners do not
prefer being locked in to an agreement for a longer time period. However, such
contractual agreements are considered effective for bona fide farmers whose livelihood
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depends on farming and are not common across states. Only a fewer states have
restrictive agreements on agricultural land, whereas some states have restrictive
agreements only for open-space land that qualifies for CU assessment. The states with
restrictive agreements on agricultural land are California, New York, Pennsylvania,
Vermont and Washington, and Florida has restrictive agreements on open-space land.
Figure 3.3 shows the distribution o f CU programs with restrictive agreements across
states.
Owing to the fact that no prior empirical research has detailed the reasons for CU
program implementation and variation in CU penalties, I focus on two main objectives in
this chapter. The -first objective is to understand the determinants o f CU program
implementation, and the second objective is to explore the reasons for specific
distribution o f CU withdrawal penalties over the period 1949-1997. As discussed in detail
in section 3.2, states-’ objectives o f program implementation and withdrawal penalties
have been mainly attributed to land use patterns and disproportional property tax burdens
based on income from agricultural lands. That is, states have implemented the program to
discourage conversion o f rural land to more urbanized uses. Based on those theoretical
claims, the hypotheses tested in this chapter are as follows. The first hypothesis is an
increase in urban land and agricultural land increases the hazard rate o f implementing CU
programs. When considering the imposition o f a withdrawal penalty, I hypothesize that
states with a higher percentage o f urban land and states with higher dependency on
property taxes as the state’s tax revenue source are more likely to impose a withdrawal
penalty.
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Three econometric analyses are used in this chapter. The techniques are duration
analysis, competing-risk regressions and random effect multinomial logit analysis. The
third objective o f this chapter is to check the validity o f the Independence o f Irrelevant
Alternatives (IIA) assumption, using the Hausman (Hausman & McFadden, 1984) test
statistic. Although there are some widely accepted tests to assess the IIA assumption,
various simulation studies have shown that these tests are not useful for assessing violations
of the IIA assumption (Long & Freese, 2006) due to conflicting results provided from those
tests. I used the Hausman and Wald statistics to compare whether those tests assess the
-

IIA assumption consistently. In considering competing risk regressions, the first model I
focus on is the cause-specific Cox regression model (1972). The second competing risk
regression model is the model proposed by Fine and Gray (Fine & Gray, 1999; Steele,
Goldstein, & Browne, 2004).
The fourth objective o f this chapter is to compare the above two competing risk
models in predicting CU withdrawal penalty imposition in the U.S. using 1949-1997 state
level data. Detailed information on the above techniques is provided in the next section.
The rest o f the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.3 provides information on data
and empirical methodologies, and is followed by the results section. The last section
provides conclusions and a discussion on possible avenues for further research on CU
programs.
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3.2 State Objectives in Current Use Assessment Laws
The objectives o f implementing CU assessment law for property tax purposes must
have been fairly different across states. However, those objectives fall into two major
categories: improving equity o f property tax burden and influencing land development
(Hady & Sibold, 1974).
The equity argument basically revolves around two main criterions: the ability to
pay and the benefits received. According to the ability to pay criterion, agricultural
landowners pay too much in property taxes. Disproportionately high property taxes are
generally more common among agricultural landowners, because o f larger holding sizes.
According to Hady and Sibold (1974), personal property taxes for agricultural
landowners in the U.S. have hiked up to 7.6% in 1971 compared to 5.7% in 1961, which
clearly supports the argument that there was a disproportionate increase in property tax
burden for agricultural landowners in 1960s. This comparative rise in property tax burden
compared to income o f agricultural landowners must have been an apparent reason for
property tax reforms that initiated across the U.S. in the 1960s and 1970s. According to
the benefits received criterion o f the equity argument, agricultural landowners pay
A

property taxes entirely out o f proportion to the services they require from the local
government. As suggested in the ability to pay and benefits received criterions, property
taxes needed to be adjusted according to income potential o f agricultural land, which
must have been a driving force behind CU program implementation by most o f the states.
The second objective o f CU program implementation considers the influence o f the
pace and direction o f land development. Growing interest in the ecology and the
environment, and the argument on property tax driven selling o f land have been major
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reasons behind the land development argument (Hady & Sibold, 1974; Schoeplein &
Schoeplein, 1972). The property tax driven land development may not be applicable for
all agricultural landowners. Because some agricultural landowners may be sensitive to
property taxes, others may not. For example, for some agricultural landowners, farming
is part o f their life and therefore, they may not be persuaded to sell land even when
farming is not profitable. For such landowners, lower property taxes would make
agricultural activities more profitable. Some other landowners may be holding on to
agricultural activities until a profitable option opens up and will be willing to sell the
agricultural land for more urbanized uses. Therefore, any property tax relief program is
needed to distinguish bona fide agricultural landowners from speculators. As a result,
some o f the CU programs impose penalties upon withdrawal o f land from the CU
program. However, it is always argued whether withdrawal penalties are enough to hold
back land speculators from selling land.
The above arguments summarize the objectives behind CU assessment laws.
According to Rodgers and Williams (1983), some states have combined the objectives in
provisions o f their CU implementation.

Table 3.2 summarizes the intents o f the CU

value assessment in some states. As shown, the CU program has implemented with
combined objectives to alleviate the disproportionate property tax burden from
agricultural landowners, while providing a tax incentive to protect agricultural land from
conversion.
It is clear that CU withdrawal penalties have been included in CU legislations to
discourage short-term property tax gains or/and to discourage land conversion. However,
the penalties have always been criticized too, because, there is a possibility that
68

landowners may place a value on non-pecuniary benefits o f preserving land when
deciding to enroll land in the program. This desire to provide non-pecuniary benefits by
preserving the character of rural community and by ensuring continued flow o f
ecosystem services that would benefit the public, should have been accounted for as
“eco-system services” provided by a landowner by keeping rural land out o f
development. The argument would be to impose a withdrawal penalty only if the savings
from CU taxation are greater than the actual total benefit, i.e “fair-retum,” a community
would receive by preserving the rural character.

3.3 Data and Methodology
This study analyzes the factors that determined the implementation o f CU
programs and imposition o f withdrawal penalties. The period o f analysis is from 19491997, which is broken down into four-year intervals, and is the period when most states,
except Michigan, implemented some version o f a CU program. I used 50 states for the
analysis o f CU implementation and only 49 states for analyses on CU withdrawal
penalties. The data required for this study are from numerous sources., as described
below. Land used for agricultural purposes, forestland, urban areas, total land area,
farmland values and net farm income data are from the Economic Research Service
(ERS) o f the United States Department o f Agriculture (USDA). Population statistics are
from the U.S. Census Bureau. The data source for state level property tax revenue and
income tax revenue is the Local Tax Collection Data o f the U.S. Census. The article by
Hady & Sibold (1974) on CU programs and the Hunting Heritage o f the Multistate
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Conservation Grant Program10 were used to get CU program data. Details o f the
empirical strategies used in this chapter are described below. Theoretical background o f
the models used in this chapter is given in the appendix (see pages 145-153).
As described in 3.1, three types o f CU programs can be identified. Figures 3.1 3.3 show the states with preferential assessment, differed taxation and restrictive
agreements. Distinguishing between restrictive agreements from two other types o f CU
programs was challenging, and the duration analyses and competing risk regressions were
done only considering preferential assessment and differed taxation.

3.3.1

Empirical Strategy: Duration Analysis
Objectives of this chapter are to understand the socio-economic and geographical

factors that determined the implementation o f the program and imposition o f different
penalty structures across states. The Cox Proportional Hazard model (Fox & Andersen,
2005; Kiefer, 1988) has been widely used in duration (event-history) analysis studies and
therefore is used in this chapter in determining the effect o f different covariates on CU
implementation and imposition o f a CU withdrawal penalty.
Assuming n states for the study, the Cox model has the form:

^ (t) = ex'J\
where x t = (xn,x i2,

(0 = c fo (0 ,

i = 1,2,

,x jk) is the vector o f covariates;

n

P = (PX,P2,

,Pk) is

the vector

o f regression coefficients; /i,(0 is the hazard rate calculated for each state; and i and h0{t)
represent the baseline hazard rate. The baseline probability function corresponding to this

10 http wwvv. huntingheritage.org/
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study is the probability o f CU program implementation (or withdrawal penalty
imposition) when all covariates are zero.
This chapter analyzes the influence o f the following covariates (xt) :percentages
of state’s land area that are urban land, rural transportation land11, farmland; net farm
income, state’s per capita income, population growth, dependency on property tax and
income taxes as state’s sources o f revenue. As shown in figure 3.2, a specific regional
distribution o f penalties is observed. Therefore, in addition to the above variables, this
chapter uses regional dummy variables to analyze the determinants in penalty imposition.
The regions considered are Midwest, West, Northeast and South. According to Kiefer
(1998), the validity o f Cox regression results is conditional based on the assumption of
proportional hazard for the model. If the proportional hazard assumption is violated, it
indicates a time trend in the covariates studied. To overcome the biasness due to violation
of proportional hazard, inclusion o f time interactions o f covariates is needed. The
covariates with time trends are identified by Schoenfeld (Fox & Andersen, 2005)
residuals plots. Therefore, initial Cox regression results were tested for the proportional
hazard assumption, using the Global test and using Schoenfeld residuals plots.
According to Fox (2005) and Kiefer (1988), any systematic departures from a horizontal
line o f Schoenfeld residuals plots are indicative o f non-proportional hazards. I f the
proportional hazards assumption is not violated, no further analyses were done. In the
case o f proportional hazard assumption violation, interactions between covariates and
time were included to the initial Cox regression model.

11 Rural transportation: Highways, roads, and railroad rights-of way, plus airport facilities outside an urban
area
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3.3.2

Empirical Strategy: Random Effect Multinomial Logit Regression
Random effect multinomial logit (RMNL) is used by researchers when the

dependent variable is in the form o f unordered discrete categories. In this chapter,
dependent variables are the types o f penalties imposed by states when a CU property is
withdrawn from the program. As described before, five types o f penalties were identified.
To analyze the RMNL model, I used the STATA package’s Generalized Linear Latent
and Mixed Models (GLLAMMs) as suggested by Carolyn et. al. (2010). A description
on RMNL is provided in section A.2 o f the appendix (pages 148-149).
RMNL regression is used to find out which penalty categories should be
combined for further analyses in competing risk regressions (see 3.3.3 for a discussion on
competing risk regressions used in this chapter). Three RMNL regressions are
considered. The dependent variables o f the above RMNL regressions are different due to
the number o f penalty categories. Wald statistics was used to test whether any penalty
categories can be combined, and, with the last model, I used Hausman (Hausman &
McFadden, 1984) statistic to test Independence o f Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
hypothesis.

3.3.3

Empirical Strategy: Competing Risk Regression Model
This section describes the estimations used to determine characteristics o f states

that led to imposition o f a CU withdrawal penalty using competing risk models, as
described by the cause-specific Cox regression model and the Fine and Gray (F&G)
competing risk model. Choosing between the Cox model and F&G is important for the
researcher. For example, if the researcher wants to compare the hazard rate o f a given
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event while ignoring the influence from other competing events, then the cause-specific
Cox regression is recommended. In the F&G model, the incidence rate o f the event is
calculated while considering the influence o f competing events. The F&G model is most
widely used in competing risk models (Sun & Tiwari, 1995). This chapter focuses on
providing a comparison o f results using the above two competing risk regression models.
As discussed before, five CU penalty categories were identified along with states
that have no CU withdrawal penalty. The period o f analysis is from 1949-1997, in which
data reported in four-year intervals.

The covariates (x,)used for the Cox and F&G

models are: percentage o f urban land, rural transportation land, farmland, net farm
income, state’s per capita income, population growth, dependency on property tax and
income taxes as a state’s source o f revenue. In addition, regional dummy variables are
used. To analyze competing risks models, I used R packages survival and cmprsk.

3.4 Results and Discussion
Visual display is important in recognizing and displaying data that could have any
geographical distribution. Penalties for withdrawing land for residential or commercial
development apply to landowners in 35 states. Figure 3.1 shows the distribution o f CU
withdrawal penalties across the country. As shown, the states with some sort o f CU
withdrawal penalty are mostly concentrated in the East and West Coasts, whereas the
states with no withdrawal penalty are to be found mostly in the Midwest. The states with
no CU withdrawal penalties are Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Kansas,
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Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma and
South Dakota.
State summary statistics for the years 1949-1997 are shown in table 3.3. As shown,
the mean net farm income per acre declined from $64 in 1949 to $52 in 1997. Similarly,
the percentage o f farmland decreased to 4 percent in 1997, compared to 6 percent in
1949. In contrast, the percentage o f urban land increased to 6.6 percent in 1997 from 2
percent in 1949.

3.4.1

Duration Analysis Results
In the duration analysis, the factors considered for implementation o f the program

are percentage o f urban land, rural transportation land, farmland, net farm income, state’s
per capita income, population growth, dependency on property tax and income taxes as
state’s sources of revenue. The sample consists o f all states in the U.S. for the period
1949-1997. As expected, urban land, farmland and population growth have increased the
hazard rate o f implementing CU program. As shown in table 3.4, a one percent increase
in urban land increases the CU implementation by seven percent, and a one percent
increase in farmland increases the CU implementation by one percent. Also, the results
suggest that if a state is highly dependent on property taxes as the source o f revenue, then
a one percent increase in property tax dependence results in an 11 percent drop in CU
implementation risk.
Above results are valid only if the proportional hazard assumption is not violated.
To test the proportional hazard assumption, I used two tests: the Global test and the
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Schoenlfeld residual plots. Performing two diagnostic tests was important to cross
validate the results. The statistics o f the Global test are shown in table 3.6. As shown
from the Global test, the assumption o f proportional hazard cannot be rejected. The
results from the Global test are also confirmed from Schoenlfeld residual plots as shown
in figure 3.4.
Table 3.5 shows two Cox regression model results on CU withdrawal penalty
imposition. As discussed before, the model on CU penalty imposition was also tested for
proportional hazard assumption using Global test and Schoenlfeld residual plots on
covariates focused on in this chapter. The Global test results (table 3.6) on the imposition
o f withdrawal penalties suggest marginal evidence o f non-proportional hazard o f the
model. Schoenlfeld residual plots in figures 3.5 and 3.6 also show noticeable departures
from the time axis on the variables farmland, per capita income and Midwest regional
dummy variables, which indicates that there is a time trend on those variables for penalty
imposition. The variables with possible time trend needed to be corrected because o f
proportional hazard assumption violation. In this chapter, I use time interactions o f the
above mentioned suspected variables (farmland, per capita income and Midwest regional
dummy) as a remedy for proportional hazard assumption violation. The results obtained
after including time interactions are shown in table 3.5. As expected, the coefficient o f
the time interaction variable o f the Midwest regional dummy is negative (see table 3.5)
and statistically significant. This implies that the hazard rate o f imposing a penalty in the
Midwest is lower, and, overtime, the hazard rate in imposing a penalty has gone up. The
results also suggest that an increase in farmland by 1% results in a decrease in hazard rate
o f CU withdrawal penalty imposition by 86%. Also, the results suggest an increase in

hazard rate in imposing a CU withdrawal penalty with increase in per capita income in a
state.

3.4.2

Random Effect Multinomial Regression Results on Combining Different
Penalty Categories
This section o f the analysis focuses on finding the validity o f IIA assumption by

comparing Wald test and Hausman statistics. For this analysis, I initially considered six
penalty categories (0-5) on CU withdrawal. Penalty category 0 represents states with no
penalty; 1 represents states with a fixed market value penalty; 2 represents states with a
sliding scale market value penalty; 3 represents the states that collect years o f tax savings
as the penalty (roll-back penalty); 4 represents states that collect additional interest on
calculated roll-back penalty; and 5 represents the states with sliding scale roll-back
penalty. Multinomial Logit (MLogit) is often used in the case o f unordered categorical
dependent variables. Because o f the longitudinal nature o f the data, a random effect
multinomial logit (RMNL) regression is used to analyze the reasons for specific
distribution o f penalty categories.
First, the data were analyzed using an RMNL model with six penalty categories. I
also wanted to find out whether any o f the above categories could be combined in the
analysis. I used Stata’s Generalized Linear Latent and Mixed Model (GLLAMM)
command (Rabe-Hesketh, 2004) for RMNL analysis. RMNL results with six penalty
categories are shown in table 3.8.
Following the first RMNL estimation, I performed the post estimation Wald test
to verily whether any o f the dependent variable categories could be combined. The null
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hypothesis o f the Wald test is as follows: All coefficients except intercepts associated
with a given pair o f outcomes are zero (i.e., categories can be collapsed). According to
Long and Freese (2006), if two dependent variables are indistinguishable, then combining
the two dependent variables will yield more efficient estimates. Using RMNL estimates
with six categories, the Wald test was performed. The statistics are shown in table 3.9. As
shown, none o f the categories 1-5 should be combined with the ‘no penalty’ category.
Wald test statistic results for categories 1 and 2 reject the hypothesis o f the Wald test and,
as a result, penalty categories 1 and 2 were combined for further analysis. By combining
the categories 1 and 2 (market value penalty and declining market value penalty with the
length of enrollment), the six categories are reduced to five. Further analysis was carried
out using RMNL analysis and the Wald test, to see any possible combination o f
dependent variables from five categories as shown in tables 3.10 and 3.11. As shown in
table 3.10, the results still suggest possible combination o f C l' with C4' (market value
and declining sliding scale roll back) or C2' with C4' (roll back penalty and declining roll
back penalty). The C2' and C4' categories were combined which resulted in four penalty
categories in total. Similarly, RMNL analysis and the Wald test were carried out with
four penalty categories. Results are shown in table 3.12 and 3.13. As shown in table 3.13,
none o f the penalty categories needs to be combined for further analyses.
According to RMNL results using the four penalty categories (see table 3.12),
states with higher percentage o f urban land have a higher probability o f imposing a
market value penalty as opposed to roll-back penalties. This result is consistent with
predictions from the duration analysis. Results suggest an important finding in terms o f
assessing the imposition o f CU withdrawal penalties in relation to farmland in a state.
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That is, states with higher percentages o f farmland are less likely to impose any
withdrawal penalties. This finding confirms one o f the objectives o f CU programs: states
have implemented this program to protect undeveloped lands in their current use rather
than resort to conversion. Results suggest an interesting finding about state’s dependence
on property taxes. My hypothesis was that penalties are imposed to recapture local
government’s property tax forgone, especially when property tax contributes to a larger
share o f the revenue o f the state. As shown in table 3.12, results do not support the above
hypothesis. Interestingly, the hazard rate o f imposing a CU withdrawal penalty rises with
increases in income tax percent and per capita income in a state.
An assumption o f multinomial logit models is that outcome categories for the
model have the property o f independence o f irrelevant alternatives (IIA). That is,
inclusion or exclusion o f categories should not have any effect on the results. In the
literature there are arguments against this assumption casting doubts about the tests (Long
and Freese, 2006) due to the generation o f conflicting results. As discussed before, I
performed several RMNL analyses and Wald tests to understand the most appropriate
combination o f penalties for this chapter. I started with six penalty categories and my
results suggested the combination o f some penalty categories. IIA test statistics for
RMNL analyses with five and six penalty categories failed due to poor convergence o f
results o f the full model (with all penalty categories) and restricted form models (with
one less penalty category). This proves that the Wald test statistics o f penalty category
combination and Hausman test (IIA assumption) statistics complement each other. The
Hausman test statistic used to check IIA assumption was performed after RMNL analysis
with four penalty categories. Dropping the penalty category 3" (see table 3.7), a reduced
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form o f the RMNL model was tested against the full model. The Hausman test statistic is
4.91 with a chi2 probability o f 0.426. The results suggest that the IIA assumption holds
true for the RMNL model with four penalty categories. That is, inclusion or exclusion o f
categories has no effect on results. The Wald test result also concluded that no further
combination o f categories is required. Hence, penalties are independent from each other.
Therefore, my results suggest that the Hausman test is valid to test IIA assumption.
As described before, CU penalties across states vary considerably, and I identified
five penalty categories (see figure 3.2). The objective o f RMNL analysis described in
section 3.4.2 is to statistically understand whether any penalties are independent o f each
other in order to consider them as belonging to separate penalty categories. With the
results obtained from this section, the four independent penalty categories are used in
competing risk regression analysis in the next section.

3.4.3

Competing Risk Regressions Results
This section presents a summary o f results obtained from competing risk

regressions which are shown in tables 3.14 and 3 .1 5 .1 used cause-specific Cox regression
and F&G models to analyze unordered penalty categories with an emphasis on the time
of the penalty imposition.
In competing risk models, I hypothesized a correlation between the increase in
hazard o f penalty imposition and higher percentages o f urban area, population growth,
state’s dependence on property taxes as a source o f tax revenue and an increase in rural
transportation land percentage. Also, I hypothesized there would be a decrease in hazard
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with increases in farmland percentage in a state and state’s dependence on income taxes
as a source o f tax revenue. As discussed before, in the cause-specific Cox (CSC)
regression, competing risks are ignored in analyzing the effect o f covariates on a
particular risk. In the F&G models, the incidence rate o f the event is calculated while
considering the influence o f competing events, i.e. F&G considers cumulative incidence
function. The results are shown in table 3.14. According to Dignam et al. (2012), the
coefficients o f the CSC regression are interpreted as explained below. Let’s say a
covariate from the CSC regression has a coefficient o f 0.033. That is, the covariate will
increase the hazard rate by 3 percent for an increase in covariate by one unit
[e(0.033) = 1.033]. If a covariate from CSC regression has a coefficient o f -0.033, then
the covariate will decrease the hazard rate by 3 percent for an increase in covariate by one
unit [e(-0.033) = 0.97].

As expected, the percentage o f urban land in a state significantly increases the
hazard rate o f imposing a market value CU penalty. The same result is applicable for
fixed value and sliding scale roll-back penalties, but not in roll-back with some interest
rate added. Contrary to expectation, CSC regression results suggest a decrease in CU
penalty imposition with an increase in state’s dependence on property taxes as a tax
revenue source. Interestingly, the first two CSC regressions suggest a significant increase
in CU penalty imposition with a state’s high dependence on income taxes as the tax
revenue source.
When consider F&G competing risk model results, increases in urban land and
farmland result in an increase in cumulative incidences o f imposing a market value
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penalty by about 5 percent (insignificant) and a decrease in cumulative incidence o f
imposing a market value penalty by about 1 percent sequentially. As expected,
cumulative incidence o f imposing market value penalty is increased by about 1 percent
with respect to the increase in population by a unit. Also, the results suggest, if a state is
dependent on property taxes as its tax revenue, such states are highly likely to impose a
market value penalty. The dependence on property taxes in imposing a penalty is also
supported by roll-back penalties with an added interest rate, but not fixed rate or
declining rate roll-back penalties.

3.5 Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research
CU assessment programs have become popular among private landowners across
the United States. However, the diversity in program regulations across states are
contributing to different rates o f enrollment, length o f enrollment and the timing o f
development for urban uses. Theoretical studies have examined CU programs in general.
Due to the localized nature o f the program (at the town, county or state level) most o f the
previous studies have focused on a single state instead o f making cross-state
comparisons. Therefore, this study contributes to the literature with a comprehensive
comparison of CU programs across the United States.
This chapter focuses on finding the factors that determined CU program
implementation and imposition o f withdrawal penalties across states. The duration
analysis results support arguments that CU programs have been implemented to protect
undeveloped land in their current use. Most o f the competing risk and RMNL models
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suggest increasing hazard rates/probabilities o f imposing withdrawal penalties in states
with higher percentage o f urban land and decreasing hazard rates/probabilities when
imposing withdrawal penalties in states with higher percentage o f farmland. Also,
competing risk models used in the chapter suggest that an increase in dependence on
property tax revenue as a source o f tax revenue for states, increases the hazard o f
imposing a withdrawal penalty.
The results confirm that most CU programs have been implemented to support
agricultural landowners and as a result o f the influence in growth in urban land. The
duration model that incorporates time effects shows some noteworthy results. That is,
over time the tendency o f imposing penalties has declined in states with higher
proportions o f farmland. Comparison o f cause-specific Cox regression and the F&G
model in analyzing competing risks is important. Compared to the cause-specific
regression, F&G results more closely correspond with my hypotheses on the covariate
effect o f CU withdrawal penalty imposition.
This chapter also aimed to test the validity o f IIA assumption in a RMNL setting.
To verify the validity o f IIA assumption, I tested the independence o f penalty categories
using the Wald test, and combined categories if two penalties were not different from
each other. This independence o f penalties resulted in four penalty categories instead o f
the six penalty categories I started with. Interestingly, IIA assumption was violated when
I used five and six penalty categories, proving that some penalty categories are not
independent from each other.

The Hausman statistic with four penalty categories

(resulting from merging two penalties to other existing categories) proved the validity o f
IIA assumption in an RMNL setting.
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In this chapter, I focused on finding the factors that determined CU program
implementation and imposition o f withdrawal penalties in the U.S. However, it would be
important to explore whether the differences in CU programs across states in terms o f
withdrawal and enrollment requirements led to differences in land development rates.
Chapter 4 will focus on the above issue to find out whether different penalties have led to
different rates in land development.
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Table 3.1: Current Use Program Summary
State

A utom atic/by
A pplication

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut

Application
Application
Automatic
Automatic
Application
Application
Application

Delaware
Florida
Georgia

Automatic
Application
Application

Hawaii
Idaho

Automatic
Automatic
Automatic
Automatic
Automatic

Preceding 10 years o f tax saving
No
1st or 2nd year: 5 times o f tax savings
3 rd or 4th y e a r : 4 times o f savings
5th or 6th year: 3 times o f tax savings
7th or 8th y e a r : 2 times o f tax savings
10 years o f tax saving
10 years o f tax saving
3 years o f tax saving and 5% interest
10 years o f tax saving and 10% interest
No

Automatic
Automatic

No
3 years o f tax saving

Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
M ichigan
M innesota
M ississippi

Application
Application

Penalty

3 years o f tax saving
7 years o f tax saving and 8% interest
No
No
12.5 % o f market value
No
10% conveyance fee in the first year and 1% by the
10th year

No
5 years o f tax saving, or any lesser number o f tax years
starting with the year first classified
Automatic
5% transfer tax i f 20+ acres, 4% if less
Application
Conveyance fee begins in year 1 (10%) and down to
1% in year 10 (Approved, not implemented 1972)
N o Current U se Program
Application
3 years o f tax saving
Application
No

Tax Incentive
for
C onservation
E asem ent
No
Yes
Yes
No
Y es
Yes
Y es

State Purchase o f Land
for C onservation
Incom e T ax C redit

Y ear
Started

Yes
No
No
No
Income Tax Credit
Y es
Y es

1975
1967
Before 1974
1969
1965
1967

Y es
Y es
Y es

Y es
Yes
Yes

1968
1959
1978

No
Y es

No
Income Tax Credit

Y es
Y es

Yes
No

1961
1971
1970
1961

No
No
No

No
No
No

No
Y es

No
N o Income Tax Credit

1967
1979
1969
1978
1970

No
No

Income Tax Credit
Yes

1956
1972

Y es

Y es
No
Income Tax Credit

1969
1980

Y es
No

1963

State

A utom atic/by
A pplication

Penalty

Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
N ew
Hampshire
N ew Jersey
N ew M exico
N ew York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island

Automatic
Application
Application
Application
Application

No
No
3 years o f tax saving
6 years o f tax saving
10 percent o f the lull and true value

Application
Application
Application
Application
Application
Application
Automatic
Application
Application
Application

South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee

Application
Automatic
Application

Texas

Application

Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington

Application
Application
Application
Application

West Virginia

Application

State P urch ase o f Land
for C onservation
Incom e T ax C redit

Y ear
Started

1967
1973
1972

No
No

No
No
No
No
No

1975
1974

3 years o f tax saving
No
5 years o f tax saving and 10% interest
6 years o f tax saving
No
3 years o f tax saving
No
10 years o f tax saving
7 years o f tax saving and 6% interest
10% o f market value for the first 6 years and declines
to 0% by 15th year
5 years o f tax saving
No

No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No

No
Income-Tax Credit
Income Tax Credit
Income Tax credit
No
No
No
Y es
No
No

1963
1971
1972
1973
1973
1973
1968
1963
1966
1968

Y es
No

3 years o f tax saving for open-space and 5 years o f tax
saving for forests
5 years o f tax saving and 7% interest

Yes

Income Tax Credit
No
No

1976
1966
1976

No

No

1966

Yes
Y es
Yes
No

No
No
Yes
No

1969
1969
1970
1968

No

No

1977

5 years o f tax saving
20% o f market value (10% if enrolled > 10 years)
Roll-back: 5 most recent tax years
7 years o f tax saving and 20% interest; also, 20%
penalty, unless a two year “N otice to Withdraw” is
given after 8th year
5 years o f tax saving and 9% interest

Tax Incentive
for
C onservation
E asem ent
No
Yes
No

State

A utom atic/by
A pplication

Penalty

Wisconsin

Application

10% o f the market value and use value difference : <
10 acres
7.5% o f the market value and use value difference : 10
-30 acres
5% o f the market value and use value difference : > 30
acres
7 years o f tax saving and 18% interest

W yom ing
Source:

Application

http://huntingheritage.org (Multistate Conservation Grant Program), Hady &

T ax Incentive
for
C onservation
E asem ent
Yes

State P urchase o f Land
for C onservation
Incom e T ax C redit
No

Y ear
Started

1 9 74(1995
implementati
on)

Y es
Sibold (1974)

No

1973

Table 3.2: State Objectives in Current Use Assessment

State

The Intent o f the C U Value Assessment Law

A labam a

A lle v ia te p ressure o n lan d ow n ers to co n v ert their agricultural land to other u ses.

A rkansas

P rotect agricultural lan d ow n ers from extern al in flu e n c e s that m ight in crea se th e
valu e o f their property out o f p rop ortion to its in co m e p o ten tia l.

C onn ecticu t

P revent the forced co n v er sio n o f agricultural lands to m o re in te n siv e u ses.

Florida

L ow er property ta x es on agricultural lands in order to red u ce the pressure on
farm ers to con vert agricultural lands to other u ses.

G eorgia

P rovid e a m ech a n ism to red u ce th e p ressu re on la n d o w n ers to convert
agricultural land to other u ses.

K entucky

P revent the prem ature co n v er sio n o f farm land to other u ses.

M ississip p i

E nsure that the farm er is n ot put in a p o sitio n in w h ich it w o u ld b e m ore
ad vantageou s to se ll the property.

N orth
C arolina

P rovide tax re lie f to b ona fid e agricultural lan d ow n ers to p reven t prem ature
con v ersio n o f farm land to other u ses.

O klahom a

F acilitate uniform ad v a lo rem ta x a sse ssm en t p roced u res through out th e state.

P en n sylvan ia

E ncourage property o w n ers to retain their land in agricultural or forestland use,
and to p rovid e so m e ta x r e lie f to lan d ow n ers.

South
C arolina

E nsure that the a sse ssm en t o f agricultural land is rea so n a b le and th e p en a lty
sy stem is to ensure properties rem ain in agricultural cla ssific a tio n .

T en n essee

A lle v ia te land co n v er sio n p ressures p laced on agricultural land a s a result o f
urbanization and property taxation .

T exas

K eep property from d iverted from agricultural to other u rbanized u ses d u e to
in creasing property ta x burden.

W iscon sin

P rovide property ta x r e lie f for agricultural lan d ow n ers and to red u ce urban
spraw l.

V irginia

E n cou rage preservation o f agricultural and o p en sp a ce s w ith in th e reach o f
concentrated areas o f popu lation.

Sources: Rodgers and Williams (1983); Legislative Audit Bureau, State o f Wisconsin
(2010); Connecticut Department o f Revenue Administration ().

87

Table 3.3: State Summary Statistics
Variables

Unit of Measurement

1997

1949
Mean

Std.

Min

Max

Mean

Std.

Min

Max

Dev.

Dev.
Net Farm Income

Dollars per acre

64.97

45.04

6.70

242.06

52.26

48.40

3.27

215.48

Urban Land

Percentage of total land

2.01

3.29

0.06

16.49

6.63

8.55

0.16

36.06

Rural Transport Land

Percentage of total land

4.79

1.87

1.94

11.84

8.19

6.15

2.63

39.18

Forest Land

Percentage of total land

39.58

21.93

1.35

83.99

37.68

22.45

1.00

85.82

Farmland

Percentage of total land

6.10

2.19

1.07

9.86

4.21

2.54

0.02

9.43

Property Tax Rev.

Percentage of total tax revenue

5.38

5.55

0.00

28.34

1.93

3.97

0.00

17.95

Sales Tax Rev.

Percentage of total tax revenue

60.29

14.00

30.13

84.38

48.81

15.81

5.93

85.78

Income Tax Rev.

Percentage of total tax revenue

16.59

12.32

0.00

49.74

36.73

16.80

0.00

73.93

Per Capita Income

Dollars

5458.2

1149.9

2932.7

7533.6

15278

2137.7

11763

21730

Population Growth

Per 1000

111.56

54.72

-37.84

222.01

54.79

48.89

-13.60

259.18

Table 3.4: Cox Regression Results - Current Use Program Implementation
C o e f P r(> |z|)
U rban Land %
Farm land %
P opu lation G row th
Property T ax R evenue%
R ural Trans. Land%
Per C apita In com e
In com e T a x R evenu e%
C oncord ance C o e f f
L ik elih o o d R atio

e x p (c o e f)

0 .0 7 1 *
(0 .0 6 1 )
0 .0 1 4 *
(0 .0 7 3 )
0 .0 0 7 * *
(0 .0 0 4 )
-0 .1 1 6 *
(0 .0 8 1 )
0 .0 5 5
(0 .4 7 4 )

Std.Err.

1 .0 7 4

0 .0 3 8

1 .0 1 4

0 .0 0 8

1 .0 0 7

0 .0 0 2

0 .8 9 0

0 .0 6 7

1 .0 5 7

0 .0 7 7

5 .6 E -0 5
(0 .6 2 4 )

1 .0 0 0

0 .0 0 0 1

0 .0 0 1
(0 .9 0 2 )
0 .7

1.001

0 .0 1 0

P :0 .0 7 4

16.1

P :0 .0 2 4 2

W ald T est

16.61

P :0 .0 2 0 1

S co re (L o g R ank) T est

17.21

P :0 .0 1 61
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Table 3.5: Cox Regression Results - Imposition o f Current Use Withdrawal Penalty
Before Proportional Hazard Test
C oef
P r(> |z|)
Urban Land %
Farm land %
P opu lation G row th
Property T a x
R ev e n u e %
Rural Trans. Land%
Per C apita Incom e
In com e T ax
R ev e n u e %

0 .0 3 9
(0 .3 5 7 )
-0 .0 1 2
(0 .2 4 6 )
0.001
(0 .8 7 7 )
-0 .0 3 8
(0 .6 2 6 )
0 .0 0 7
(0 .9 2 6 )
0 .0 0 0 1
(0 .4 1 7 )
0 .0 0 8
(0 .5 2 3 )

e x p (c o e f)

Std. Err

1 .0 3 9

0 .0 4 2

0 .9 8 8

0 .0 1 0

1.001

0 .0 0 4

0 .9 6 3

0 .0 7 7

1 .0 0 7

0 .0 7 8

1.000

0.000

1 .0 0 8

0 .0 1 2

0 .6 6 3

0 .7 3 9

1 .0 6 6

0 .6 3 0

1 .2 8 9

0 .7 0 2

After Proportional Hazard
Test
C oef
P r(> |z|)
0 .0 5 5
( 0 .1 9 5 )
-0 .1 3 4 * *
( 0 .0 0 3 )
-0 .0 0 2
( 0 .7 0 5 )
-0 .0 7 0
( 0 .3 8 0 )
-0 .0 3 3
( 0 .6 8 9 )
0 .0 0 2 * * *
( 0 .0 0 0 )
-0 .0 0 6
( 0 .6 4 6 )

e x p (c o e f)

Std.Err

1 .0 5 7

0 .0 4 3

1 .143

0 .0 4 5

0 .9 9 8

0 .0 0 4

0 .9 3 3

0 .0 7 9

0 .9 6 8

0 .0 8 3

1 .0 0 2

0 .001

0 .9 9 4

0 .0 1 3

-9 4 2 2 * * *
( 0 .0 0 1 )
0 .6 5 7
( 0 .3 0 8 )
0 .3 3 5
( 0 .6 4 8 )

0.000

2 .7 7 0

1 .9 2 9

0 .6 4 4

1 .3 9 8

0 .7 3 4

0 .9 7 5

0 .0 0 7

4 .4 6 1

0 .4 2 0

1.000

0.000

Dummy Variables
M id w est (D u m m y )
W est (D u m m y)
N orth E ast (D u m m y)

-0.41 1
(0 .5 7 8 )
0 .0 6 4
(0 .9 1 9 )
0 .2 5 4
(0 .7 1 7 )

Time-Trend (TT)

,

-0 .0 2 5 * * *
( 0 .0 0 1 )
1 .4 9 5 * * *
( 0 .0 0 0 )

Farm land % T T
M id w est R eg io n T T

C on cord an ce C o e f f

0 .7 6 4

P :0 .0 6 6

0 .0 0 0 1 * * *
( 0 .0 0 0 )
0 .7 9 1

L ik elih o o d R atio

1 8.2 4

P :0.051

3 2 .1 7

P :0 .0 0 2

W ald T est ^

1 9 .9 2

P :0.031

3 7 .8 1

P :0 .0 0 0

S co re (L o g R ank)
T est

2 3 .9 8

P :0 .0 0 7

3 7 .6 2

P :0 .0 0 0

Per C apita Incom e
TT
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P :0 .0 6 6

Table 3.6: Regression Diagnostics - Proportional Hazard Assumption
CU Program Implementation
Rho

ChiSquare

Pr(>|z|)

Imposition of CU Withdrawal
Penalty
Chirho
Pr(>|z|)
Square

U rban Land %

-0 .0 0 6

0 .0 0 3

0 .9 6 0

-0 .0 9 6

0 .4 0 0

0 .5 2 7

Farm land %

-0 .1 0 2

0 .6 1 5

0 .4 3 3

-0 .3 7 1 * *

4 .9 7 0

0 .0 2 6

P opu lation G rowth

-0 .0 2 3

0 .0 1 9

0 .8 8 9

0 .1 6 0

0 .6 9 9

0 .4 0 3

Property T a x R ev. %

-0 .0 3 0

0 .0 4 7

0 .8 2 8

-0 .0 7 8

0 .2 0 8

0 .6 4 8

R ural Trans. Land%

0 .0 0 5

0 .0 0 2

0 .9 6 9

0 .2 1 7

1 .9 1 0

0 .1 6 7

Per C apita In com e

-0 .0 4 6

0 .1 0 0

0 .7 5 2

-0 .3 0 * * *

8 .1 5 0

0 .0 0 4

In com e T ax R ev. %

-0 .1 6 6

1.371

0 .2 4 2

0 .0 6 0

0 .1 4 9

0 .7 0 0

0 .3 0 0 * *

6 .4 3 0

0 .0 1 1

-0 .0 0 4

0 .0 0 1

0 .9 7 8

0 .1 7 1

1 .6 4 0

0 .2 0 0

NA

1 5 .4 0 0

0 .1 1 7

Dummy Variables
M id w est (D u m m y )
W est (D u m m y)
N orth E ast (D u m m y)
G lobal

NA

2 .6 4 9
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0 .9 1 5

D escrip tion

CO

N o C U w ithd raw al p en alty

Cl

M arket v a lu e p en a lty - F ix e d rate

C2

M arket v a lu e p en a lty - D e c lin in g rate

C3

R oll-b ack p en alty - F ix e d rate

C4

R oll-b ack p en a lty fix e d rate w ith additional in terest

C5

R oll-b ack p en alty - D e c lin in g rate

C l'

M arket v a lu e p en a lty - F ix e d rate + D e c lin in g rate (C 1 + C 2 )

C 2' = C 3

R oll-b ack p en alty - F ix e d rate

C 3' = C 4

R oll-b ack p en a lty w ith a d d ition al interest
R oll-b a ck p en a lty - D e c lin in g rate

n

Penalty C ategory

O
-t^
II

Table 3.7: Classification of Current Use Withdrawal Penalties

ci" = c r

M arket v a lu e p en a lty - F ix e d rate + D e c lin in g rate (C 1 + C 2 )

C2"

R oll-b a ck p en a lty - F ix e d rate + D e c lin in g rate (C 3 + C 5 )

C 3'' = C 4

R oll-b ack p en alty w ith a d d ition al interest
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Table 3.8: Random Effects Multinomial Logit Regression Log-odds Ratios of
Penalty Determination
V ariables

M arket

M arket

R o ll-b a c k

R o ll-b a c k

R o ll-b a c k

V alu e ( C l )

V a lu e

P en alty (C 3 )

w ith Interest

D e c lin in g

(C 4 )

(C 5 )

S lid in g
S c a le (C 2 )
Urban land %

Farm land %

Property ta x %

In com e ta x %

P opu lation grow th

0 .9 5 9

3 .3 0 3 * *

0 .9 5 2

0 .7 5 1 * *

1 .2 1 2

(0 .6 8 2 )

( 0 .0 0 3 )

( 0 .6 1 3 )

(0 .0 1 9 )

( 0 .2 5 9 )

3 .8E -7 * *

1 .9 E -8 * '

2 .8 8 E -6 * * *

7 .0 E -6 * * *

1 .3 E -7 * * *

(0 .0 0 0 )

( 0 .0 4 0 )

( 0 .0 0 0 )

(0 .0 0 0 )

( 0 .0 0 0 )

0 .8 3 6

0 .0 0 0 * *

0 .6 7 7 *

0 .8 2 3

. 0 .2 8 2

(0 .3 1 2 )

( 0 .0 0 8 )

( 0 .0 2 9 )

(0 .2 4 3 )

( 0 .1 1 8 )

1.102**

1 .1 7 6

1 .0 8 1 * *

1 .0 0 5

1 .1 3 4 * *

(0 .0 0 3 )

( 0 .0 3 4 )

( 0 .0 0 9 )

(0 .8 6 8 )

( 0 .0 0 8 )

0 .9 8 2

0 .9 3 0

0 .9 7 9 *

0 .9 5 4 * * *

1 .0 0 4

(0 .0 0 0 )

( 0 .8 3 4 )

(0 .0 8 2 )
Rural transport, land
%
Per capita in com e

( 0 .0 9 3 )

( 0 .0 3 1 )

1 .3 1 9

0 .1 0 5 *

1 .3 3 9

1 .4 1 6

0 .5 9 2

(0 .1 2 7 )

( 0 .0 3 6 )

( 0 .0 9 6 )

(0 .0 5 2 )

< 0 .2 2 3 )

1 .003* * *

1 .0 0 2 * *

1 .0 0 3 * * *

1 .0 0 4 * * *

1 .0 0 3 * * *

( 0 .0 0 0 )

(0 .0 0 0 )

(0 .0 0 0 )

(0 .0 0 0 )

( 0 .0 0 6 )
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Table 3.9: Penalty Category Combination Test
Test

Chi2(Prob)

Combine or Not

C1=C0

32.3 (0.000)

No

C2=C0

20.84 (0.004)

No

C3=C0

31.63 (0.000)

No

C4=C0

35.44 (0.000)

No

C5=C0

28.52 (0.000)

No

C1=C2

11.93 (0.103)

Yes

C3=C4

38.83 (0.000)

No

C3=C5

7.56 (0.0373)

No

C4=C5

23.48 (0.001)

.No
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Table 3.10: Random Effects Multinomial Logit Regression Log-odds Ratios of
Penalty Determination - 5 Categories
Variables

Urban land %

Market
Value (Cl')

Roll-back
Penalty
(C2')

Roll-back
with Interest
(C3')

Roll-back
Declining
(C4')

Independent

1.020
(0.776)

0.925
(0.259)

0.735**
(0.002)

1.042
(0.752)

22.92
(0.000)

O.OOOE-7***
(0.000)

0.000E-5***
(0.000)

O.OOOE-5**
(0.000)

0.000E-6***
(0.002)

8.41
(0.077)

0.837
(0.300)

0.716
(0.054)

0.834
(0.260)

0.411
(0.218)

25.95
(0.000)

1.100***
(0.001)

1.081**
(0.004)

1.004
(0.899)

1.131**
(0.003)

6.21
(0.184)

Population growth

0.987
(0.237)

0.984
(0.109)

0 959***
(0.000)

1.008
(0.633)

31.91
(0.000)

Rural transportation
land

1.179
(0.328)

1.263
(0.149)

1.324
(0.091)

0.661
(0.253)

8.41
(0.077)

1.003***
(0.000)

1.003***
(0.000)

1.003***
(0.000)

1.003***
(0.000)

35.23
(0.000)

Farmland %

Property tax %

Income tax %

Per capita income
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Table 3.11: Penalty Category Combination Test - 5 Categories
C o m b in e or N o t

C 1'=C 0

3 7 .2 4 ( 0 .0 0 0 )

No

C 2 -C 0

3 2 .0 7 ( 0 .0 0 0 )

No

C 3 -C 0

3 6 .9 0 ( 0 .0 0 0 )

No

2 9 .8 5 ( 0 .0 0 0 )

No

C 1 -C 2 '

3 2 .4 (0 .0 0 0 )

No

C 1 -C 3 '

4 5 .6 2 (0 .0 0 0 )

No

C 1 -C 4 '

8 .4 5 (0 .2 9 4 )

Y es

C 2 —C3'

3 7 .3 9 (0 .0 0 0 )

No

C 2 -C 4 '

7.21 (0 .4 0 7 )

Y es

C 3 -C 4 '

2 3 .4 2 (0 .0 0 0 )

No

o
o

If

C hi2(P rob )

o

Test

Combined C2' and C4', not C l ' and C4' penalty categories
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Table 3.12: Random Effects Multinomial Logit Regression Log-odds Ratios of
Penalty Determination - 4 Categories
Variables

Market Value
(Cl")

Urban land %

1.021
(0.762)
O.OOOE-7***
(0.000)
0.843
(0.306)
j 099 ***
(0.001)
0.987
(0.197)
1.179
(0.321)
1 003***
(0.000)
4.91
(0.426)

Farmland %
Property tax percent
Income tax percent
Population growth
Rural transportation
land
Per capita income
IIA Statistics
Chi2 (Prob)

Roll-back
Penalty + Roll
back Declining
(C2")
0.928
(0.282)
0.000E-5***
(0.000)
0.716*
(0.048)
1.083**
(0.003)
0.984
(0.097)
1.245
(0.170)
1.003***
(0.000)

Dropped category 3
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Roll-back
with Interest
(C3")

0.737***
(0.002)
0.000E-5***
(0.000)
0.838
(0.264)
1.005
(0.867)
0.959***
(0.000)
1.312
(0.096)
1.003***
(0.000)

Independent

22.15(0.000)
27.2
(0.000)
5.8
(0.121)
31.14
(0.000)
36.16
(0.000)
4.44
(0.217)
36.16
(0.000)

Table 3.13: Penalty Category Combination Test - 4 Categories
Test

Chi2(Prob)

Combine or Not

C1"=C0

37.14(0.000)

No

C2"=C0

32.29 (0.000)

No

C3"=C0

37.04 (0.000)

No

C1"=C2"

32.75 (0.000)

No

C1”=C3"

45.36 (0.000)

No

C2"=C3"

38.55 (0.000)

No
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Table 3.14: Cause-specific Cox Regression Results
Market Value Penalty

Urban Land %
Farm land %
P opulation G rowth
Property T a x R even u e
%
Rural Trans. Land% .
Per C apita Incom e
In com e T ax R ev en u e
%

C oef
P r(>|z|)
0 .1 0 9 *
(0 .0 8 6 )
0 .0 0 7
(0 .8 5 9 )
0 .0 0 9
(0 .2 0 5 )
0 .2 0 2
(0 .5 2 0 )
0 .1 0 6
(0 .6 2 1 )
-0.001
(0 .1 3 2 )
0 .0 4 7
(0 .1 8 9 )

e x p (c o e f)
1 .1 1 5
1 .0 0 7
1 .0 0 9
1 .2 2 4
1.111
0 .9 9 9
1 .0 4 8

Roll-back Penalty
with Declining Roll
back
C oef
P r(> |z|)
0 .0 9 6
( 0 .2 4 1 )
-0 .0 2 1
( 0 .2 9 4 )
0 .0 0 4
( 0 .4 9 2 )
-0 .0 7 1
( 0 .6 2 7 )
0 .2 3 6
(0 .1 0 6 )
-0 .0 0 1 * *
(0 .0 0 2 )
0 .0 3 2
(0 .1 5 7 )

e x p (c o e f)
1 .1 0 0
0 .9 7 9
1 .0 0 4
0 .9 3 1
1 .2 6 6
0 .9 9 9
1 .0 3 2

Roll-back Penalty
with Additional
Interest
C oef
P r(> |z|)
-0 .0 9 9
(0 .5 4 1 )
0 .0 0 3
(0 .9 0 1 )
-0 .0 1 1
(0 .3 0 8 )
0 .0 1 7
(0 .9 3 4 )
0 .2 3 4
(0 .2 0 9 )
0 .0 0 0
(0 .9 8 6 )
-0 .0 4 1
(0 .1 1 1 )

e x p (c o e f)
0 .9 0 6
1.003
0 .9 8 9
1 .0 1 7
1 .2 6 4
1 .0 0 0
0 .9 6 0

Dummy Variables
M id w est (D u m m y )
W est (D u m m y)
N orth E ast (D u m m y)
C oncord ance C o e f f
L ik elih ood Ratio
W ald T est
S core (L o g R ank) T est
R Square

-1 6 .6 8 0
(0 .8 4 2 )
0 .1 0 9
(0 .0 7 6 )
3 .1 4 0
(0 .9 9 8 )
0 .8 8 3
S E 0 .1 1 9
1 8 .3 4
(0 .0 4 9 )
9.5
(0 .4 8 5 )
2 6 .6 8
(0 .0 0 2 )
0 .3 1 2

0 .0 0 0
1 .1 1 5
2 3 .1 0 0

2 .2 2 0 *
( 0 .0 6 8 )
0 .6 3 6
( 0 .5 2 0 )
-0 .5 5 5
(0 .6 8 0 )
0 .8 0 9
S E 0 .0 9
1 5.25
(0 .1 2 3 )
1 4 .0 4
( 0 .1 7 1 )
16.61
( 0 .0 8 3 )
0 .2 6 7

99

9 .2 0 5
1 .8 8 9
0 .5 7 4

0 .3 1 2
(0 .8 4 2 )
0 .4 4 8
(0 .8 1 4 )
1 .2 0 7
(0 .3 7 1 )
0 .7 5 5
S E 0.11
8 .2 9
(0 .6 0 0 )
8 .2 5
(0 .6 0 4 )
10.3
(0 .4 1 5 )
0 .1 5 6

1 .3 6 6
1 .5 6 4
3 .3 4 3

Table 3.15: Fine and Gray Competing Risk Regression Results
'

Urban L and %
Farm land %
P opu lation G row th
Property T ax R even u e
%
Rural Trans. Land%
Per C apita In com e
In com e T ax R even u e
%

Market Value Penalty

C oef
P r(> |z|)
0 .0 4 7
(0 .3 0 0 )
-0 .0 1 9
(0 .3 8 0 )
0 .0 0 8 *
(0 .0 9 6 )
0 .1 4 5
(0 .2 7 0 )
-0 .0 0 7
(0 .9 6 0 )

0.000
(0 .9 0 0 )
0 .0 3 9 *
(0 .0 7 5 )

e x p (c o e f)
1 .0 4 8
0 .9 8 1
1 .0 0 9
1 .1 5 6
0 .9 9 3

1.000
1 .0 4 0

Roll-back Penalty
with Declining Roll
back
C oef
P r(> |z|)
0 .0 5 7
( 0 .5 9 0 )
-0 .0 2 4
( 0 .2 2 0 )
-0 .0 0 2
( 0 .5 9 0 )
-0 .0 3 3
( 0 .8 1 0 )
0 .1 1 0
( 0 .3 5 0 )

0.000
(0 .1 3 0 )
0 .0 2 7
( 0 .2 4 0 )

e x p (c o e f)
1 .0 5 8
0 .9 7 6
0 .9 9 8
0 .9 6 7
1 .1 1 6

Roll-back Penalty
with Additional
Interest
C oef
P r(> |z|)
-0 .1 4 5 * *
(0 .0 4 6 )
-0 .0 0 2
(0 .9 5 0 )
-0 .0 1 2
(0 .3 3 0 )
0 .0 3 2
( 0 .8 9 0 )
0 .1 8 2
( 0 .3 5 0 )

e x p (c o e f)
0 .8 6 5
0 .9 9 8
0 .9 8 8
1.033
1 .1 9 9

1.000

0.000

1.000

1 .0 2 8

( 0 .4 8 0 )
-0 .0 4 2 * *
( 0 .0 3 4 )

0 .9 5 8

Dummy Variables
M id w est (D u m m y )

1.6 9 0
(0 .1 6 0 )

5 .441

W est (D u m m y )
N orth E ast (D u m m y)
P seu d o L o g -lik elih o o d
P seu d o lik elih o o d ratio
test

2 .2 2 0
(0 .0 3 4 )
-2 3 .7

9 .2 0 4

0 .5 4 4
( 0 .5 6 0 )
-0 .0 2 5
( 0 .9 7 0 )
-1 .8 3 2
( 0 .2 0 0 )
-63.1
8 .4 4

1 3.8
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1 .7 2 3
0 .9 7 6
0 .1 6 0

-0 .3 9 8
( 0 .8 4 0 )
-0 .4 4 7
( 0 .8 3 0 )
0 .5 7 6
( 0 .5 3 0 )
-2 9 .9
9 .1 6

0 .6 7 2
0 .6 4 0
1 .7 7 8

Figure 3.1: Preferential Current Use Taxation Versus Deferred Taxation States

Preferential Taxation
0

Deferred Taxation
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Figure 3.2: Current Use Withdrawal Penalty Categories

Preferential CU Program (N aC U Penalty)
Market Value Penalty (Fixed R ate)
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Figure 3.3: Current Use Program with Restrictive Agreements on Agricultural
Land
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Figure 3.4: Proportional Hazard Diagnostic Schoenfeld Residuals Graphs Program Implementation
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Figure 3.5: Proportional Hazard Diagnostic Schoenfeld Residuals Graphs - Current
Use Withdrawal Penalty
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Figure 3.6: Proportional Hazard Diagnostic Graphs - Current Use Withdrawal
Penalty
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C hapter 4

4

E v a l u a t io n

of

E f f e c t iv e n e s s

of

C u r r e n t U se P r o p e r t y T a x P r o g r a m s

4.1 Introduction
Current use (CU) taxation focuses on providing property tax relief to landowners
with agricultural, forestry or even sometimes with open-space undeveloped land.
Previous research, including the findings from chapter 2, shows that receiving a
considerable property tax relief has been one o f the major determinants o f enrolling land
in the CU program. Although not directly stated, legislators believed that the provided
property tax relief might discourage conversion o f land to urbanized uses such as
residential

and

commercial development.

The

CU

program ’s

effectiveness

in

discouraging conversion o f land has been widely discussed over the years. Some specific
features o f the CU program may help to delay the conversion o f land. The features that
could delay the conversion are restrictions on conversion and CU withdrawal penalties.
The first CU program feature focused on in this chapter is CU withdrawal
penalties. Based on CU withdrawal penalty structures, CU programs can be broadly
categorized into two approaches: preferential assessment and deferred taxation. Under the
preferential assessment approach, lands qualified for CU programs are assessed at value
in use, and the owner will not pay any penalty in case o f withdrawal from the program for
developed uses. In the deferred taxation approach, a tax recapture penalty is imposed
when the land is withdrawn from the program. Those penalties may discourage
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withdrawal o f enrolled land from the program and may make short-term CU enrollment
costly for the landowner. A detailed description o f states’ CU programs was given in
chapter 3.
While stricter CU penalties upon withdrawal may reduce the rate o f conversion
o f CU land to developed uses, how precisely those penalties are designed matters. For
example, England and Mohr (2003) advocate stricter penalties that decline with the
length o f enrollment o f parcels in the program. That is, if a land is enrolled for a longer
period, penalties on withdrawal will be lessened as opposed to early withdrawal. This is
an important theoretical suggestion that needs empirical verification. Based on their
model, I hypothesize that the states with rising CU withdrawal penalties experience
higher rates in land development, compared to the states with declining penalties over
time. This chapter focuses on understanding whether features o f CU penalties lead to
differences in land development in the U.S. I use a simulated database consisting o f
penalties across the U.S. to understand the effect o f penalties on land development.
The second CU program feature considered in this chapter is the presence o f
restrictive agreements (Collins, 1976; Hady & Sibold, 1974; Keene, 1976; Rodgers &
G.H.Williams, 1983) on enrollment in the program, considered the third category o f the
CU program. The states with restrictive agreements are Hawaii, California, Washington,
New York, Maine, Pennsylvania, Vermont and Florida. Restrictive agreements obligate
the landowners to refrain from developing the land for urban uses for a certain number o f
years.

A detailed description on restrictive agreements was provided in chapter 3.

Considering the effect o f restrictive agreements, I hypothesize, that states with restrictive
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agreements on land development experience lower rates o f land development over the
years.
Unavailability o f state level CU information is a drawback in this study to
compare the influence o f CU acres on development across states. Therefore, this chapter
first focuses on the simulated data developed using available information related to the
CU program. Using the simulated data, my first objective o f this study is to verify
whether higher penalties and rising penalties over time lead to different rates o f land
development across states for the years 1987-2007. Along with CU withdrawal penalties,
restrictive agreements used by some states may delay the rate o f land development.
Therefore the second objective o f this chapter is to find out whether restrictive
agreements o f some CU programs lead to differences in land development.
In contrast to the unavailability o f state level CU data, the New Hampshire CU
program maintains a comprehensive database about the program. Therefore, the New
Hampshire CU program’s statistics for the years 1999-2011, along with residential permit
issue information, are used to test whether residential development has slowed down over
the years due to enrollment o f land in the CU program. The hypothesis is that towns with
a higher percentage o f CU land have lower rates in residential land development. The
number o f new residential permits issued during the period o f study is used as a proxy for
residential development in New Hampshire. The third objective o f this chapter is to find
whether the CU program has had any influence on residential development in New
Hampshire.
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4.2. Theoretical Background of Current Use Withdrawal Penalty
The studies that focus on CU taxation programs span from theoretical models to
empirical studies. It is generally agreed that such programs give substantial tax relief to
participating landowners and as a result reduce the rates o f land conversion for more
urbanized uses (Anderson, 1998; Anderson & Griffing, 2000; Polyakov & Zhang, 2008).
However, there are studies that actually show evidence that casts doubts about the
success o f the programs (Parks & Quimio, 1996; William, R.Gottfried, Brockett, &
Evans, 2004). Theoretical models about this preferential taxation program have focused
on different determinants affecting enrollment in the program and the timing o f
development. The model developed by England and Mohr (2003) especially focuses on
withdrawal penalties for lands enrolled in the CU program.
■ According to the model, a landowner decides the timing o f development (D ),
considering the pecuniary benefits before/after the development (c and u) and nonpecuniary benefits (n) only before the development. Therefore, the owner chooses a time
to develop the land when the present value o f her income stream is maximized. In the
model the landowner maximizes:

r D[c(t) + n{t)-TA{t)]e~r'dt -

J/= 0

Present value o f returns
to undeveloped
land, net o f taxes

In the above,

P(D)e~rD
\.

t

j

Present value
°J P f natty
on withdrawal

+ ['="[w(/) - ryf(/)]e rV/

(4.1)

< *1~D

Present value o f
returns to developed
land, net o f taxes

is the property tax rate, r is the owner’s discount rate, P is penalty

fee and t denotes time. According to program specifications, most o f the states assess
undeveloped land by capitalizing the pecuniary income, while other states assess
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undeveloped parcels based on some fraction o f market value o f land.

This model

considers undeveloped land value based on land’s capitalized income. Accordingly, the
assessed value o f an undeveloped land parcel is (if it remains undeveloped):
=

A (t)

c ( t > ~ r(t ~ ^ d f . The assessed value o f a developed land parcel can be written: A

(t) = f*_™ u(t')e~r(t ~tf f t ( f o r t > D). Also, the model assumes constant c and n o f
undeveloped land, whereas the pecuniary benefits o f developed land grow at the rate o f g
and therefore, u{t) = uegl. In addition, the authors assume, initial u> c and a positive
non-confiscatory property tax rate (x). That is, the tax burden never exceeds the pecuniary
return to land. Hence, 0 < x < r-g <7. By substituting the above assumptions to equation
1, landowner’s solution can be derived as:

((1 - L ) c + n) -

T ;— t ------ '
Instantaneous
return from
undeveloped
land

P \ D ) + rP(D ) =
Effect o f
penalty
changing

Value o f
delavine
penalty

((1- — L — fre*0 )
'------------------Instantaneous return
fro m developed
land

(4.2)
'

After solving the above equation the model confirms that a landowner pays
attention to the P (penalty) as well as c(change in penalty over time) in determining the
time o f development (D). Accordingly, if a landowner delays development o f her land,
she gains rP(D), where the importance o f larger penalties is emphasized. If penalties
decline over time, then P (D) will be less than zero P (D) < 0 . That is, a penalty that
decreases over time encourages a landowner to keep land enrolled in the program to
enjoy lower penalties in the future. Hence, the benefit o f delaying land development
increases if penalties decrease with the length o f enrollment. Therefore, England and
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Mohr (2003) advocate stricter penalties that decline over time as the optimal kind o f
penalty to slower land development.

4.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
Data: This paper relies on several data sources. Land data are from the U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA) and National Resource Inventory (NRI) o f Natural Resource
Conservation Service. Developed land data are from NRI for the period 1982-2007 (US
Department o f Agriculture, 2009). Land used for agricultural purposes (crop land, forest
land), urban areas, and total land areas are from the USDA for the years 1987, 1992,
1997, 2002 and 2007. Agricultural land values and net farm income data for the years are
from the Economic Research Service (ERS) o f USDA. Population statistics are from the
U.S. Census Bureau. The data source for state level property tax revenue and income tax
revenue is the Local Tax Collection Data o f U.S. Census. Tax burden data and the
average property tax rate in 2000 are from the Tax Foundation. Data on the assessed
value ratio o f properties is collected from the Lincoln Institute o f Land Policy. State level
CU program data are from Hady & Sibold (1974) and the Hunting Heritage o f the
Multistate Conservation Grant Program (Hady & Sibold, 1974).
Data used for the case study in New Hampshire are from the New Hampshire
Department of Revenue Administration (NHDRA). The Department o f Commerce of the
U.S. Census Bureau is used as the source to obtain statistics on residential permits issued
for new privately owned residential housing in New Hampshire. The data sources used
for different variables is summarized in table 4.1.
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Property Tax Rate Simulations: The variation in property tax rates among states,
counties and towns makes it difficult to do a property tax rate comparison. Therefore, a
property tax rate simulation was performed for further analysis. I obtained tax burden
compared to per capita income, as reported in Tax Foundation Data, for all the states
from 1982-2007. The property tax rate in 2000 was obtained from official records o f each
state’s revenue department.
A sample o f property tax simulation done using New Hampshire data in the year
2001 is described below. According to the Tax Foundation12, the property tax burden per
capita income ratio in New Hampshire was 7.3. The property tax rate in New Hampshire
in 2000 was 19.9 for $1000 o f assessed value o f properties. Based on the tax burden per
capita and the property tax rate in the year 2000 , 1 calculated the tax burden to property
tax ratio in the year 2000 .
_________ Property Tax Rate2000__________
Property Tax Burden per Capita Income 2000

19.9 _
7.3

The ratio 2.73 was used to simulate property tax rates from 1982-2007. For
example, the property tax burden to per capita income was 7.6 and the property tax rate in
year 2001 was calculated as follows:
Property Tax Rate2m = Property Tax Burden p e r Capita Income2m *2.73
Property Tax Rate2m = 7.6* 2.73 = 20.75

Similar calculations were done for all the states for the years 1982-2007. The
above tax simulations were done due to the unavailability o f full value property tax rates
12 http://taxfoundation.org/arl.icle/state-and-local-tax-burdens-all-vears-one-state-1977-2010

113

at the state level. With a simulation study, the reliability o f data used in the research
could be challenged. In order to compare the reliability o f the tax simulation study, I
compared my simulated property tax data to actual property tax rate data from New
Hampshire for the years 1995-2009 (see figure 4.1). If more property tax data were
available, the above comparison could have been done for more states to check the
accuracy o f the simulated data. Table 4.2 summarizes the property tax burden
information and simulated property tax rates across states.
I continued my analysis using the above simulation o f state averages o f property
tax rates. However, the above property tax rate simulation could add some bias to my
study. As shown in figure 4.1, property tax burden per capita income has been constant
over the years (7.3-9.4), which suggests that property tax rates have been adjusted
according to market conditions. For example, property tax rates have been low during
economic downturns and have gone up during economic booms, which has led to fewer
variations in property tax burden compared to per capita income. Therefore, using
property tax burden data might add some bias in property tax simulations.

CU Value Calculation: Although the market value o f a property is considered as
the standard value o f assessment for property tax purposes, some states do not consider
the frill value o f the property in tax calculations. Rather, such states use an assessment
ratio or a partial assessed value based on the class o f the property when property taxes are
calculated. Assessment ratios for this paper are from the Lincoln Institute o f Land Policy.
For the state level analysis, the amount o f property tax charged was calculated by
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multiplying the simulated property tax rates and assessed value o f agricultural land for
the years 1987-2007. In order to calculate property tax savings when enrolling a land
parcel in a CU program, property taxes based on CU value is required. To compute
capitalization rates by states, I considered the state level average ren t 13-to-land value ratio
(England, 2011) over the period 1987-2007. The value o f agricultural land, like other
income producing assets, can be derived from the expected flow o f income. Using per
acre net farm income and the above simulated capitalization rates, use values are
, ,
,
„ „
Net Income from Agriculture
,
-T
calculated as follows: ------------------------- 2------------ . Then the CU property taxes on an
Capitalization Rate
acre of agricultural land were calculated for all the states.

CU Penalty Calculation: Assuming a land was initially enrolled in 1987, I
calculated the tax savings a landowner receives by enrolling an acre o f land in the CU
program and penalties in case o f withdrawal for all 30 states for the years 1987-2007.
Calculations done for an acre o f land in California and Georgia are shown in table 4.3.
As shown, the average value o f an acre o f agricultural land in California has increased
from $1,550 to $5,960 over the years. In California, taxes are applied to 100% o f the
market value. Therefore, if land is not enrolled in the CU program, the assessed value for
tax purposes is the same as the market value o f land. Property tax savings from enrolling
an acre o f land in a CU program are about $106 in 1987 and $444 in 2007. However, if a
landowner in California decides to withdraw the land from CU designation, a CU
withdrawal penalty is applied. In California, the CU penalty is 12.5% o f the market value

13 Rents are generally considered a short run indicator o f the return to a landowner’s investment in the land
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at the time o f withdrawal. Therefore, if an acre o f land is withdrawn, the penalty in the
first year would be $194 per acre, whereas the penalty would be $745 in 2007. According
to this calculation, a landowner with CU designated land in California may face a
withdrawal penalty despite the length o f the enrollment. In contrast, a landowner in
Georgia will face declining penalties (see table 4.3). Similar calculations were done for
all the states used for this analysis. Above penalty calculations are used for further
analysis o f this chapter.

Internal Rate of Return flRR) Calculation: According to Berry (1993), IRR o f the
CU program compares the abated taxes per acre and the taxes paid per acre following
withdrawal (Berry, 1993). The IRR. calculation formula can be given as:

+

+■'(1 + 0

=0

(4.3)

(1 + 0

where, TA is the amount o f abated taxes, LUC is the land use change tax (i.e. CU
withdrawal penalty) and n goes from 0 years to X years. The IRR signifies the degree to
which the withdrawal penalty offsets the abated property taxes resulting from enrollment
in the program. For example, a zero IRR means that the penalty completely offsets the
abated taxes with no net gain to either the property owner or the town. An IRR greater
than zero means that the penalty was larger than the tax savings incurred, so there is net
gain to the town. If it is negative, then the penalty is not large enough to offset the tax
savings, and, therefore, the landowner receives a financial gain by enrolling the land.
This paper includes a dummy variable (D = l) if a landowner gains by enrolling a land, i.e.
if IRR is negative.
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Empirical Models Used in Analyses: In determining the factors that could lead to
land development across the states, I estimate the following model:

(4.4)
In equation 4.4, Yu represents percentage rise in developed land compared to state’s land
total. In equation (4.4), X%u is a vector o f time dependent variables that are related to
the CU program. The variables considered are calculated CU penalties, property tax
savings, severity o f penalty (compared to market value o f land) and IRR.
As discussed in chapter 3, I classified CU withdrawal penalties into six major
categories. However, within each penalty category, states’ CU penalty can differ
depending on the number o f years o f recapture penalty and in the percentage charged as
market-value penalty etc. The differences in market value and CU value across states also
vary. Therefore a landowner in a state with a higher difference between CU value and
market value will be paying a higher roll-back penalty compared to a landowner in a state
with a lower difference between CU value and market value, even when the number o f
years o f recapture is the same. To introduce the differences in severity o f CU penalty, I
used a categorical variable - severity o f penalty. The ranking o f the severity o f penalties
depends on the ratio of penalty to accumulated tax savings. Depending on the above ratio,
I categorized severity o f penalties into six groups. The severity ratio 0 is given for states
with no CU penalty. Other penalty severity categories are >0-25, >25-50, > 50-75, >75100 and > 100 .

The vector X ''and includes several land characteristics relevant in predicting the
rate o f land development. The variables are percentage o f federal land, percentage o f
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developed land in the previous year and the percentage o f rural transportation land. The
vector X f sricu includes farm dependency index (FDI ) 14 and agricultural land value per
acre.

The vector X f her includes three dummy variables to introduce other land

conservation programs, including conservation reserve program (CRP), conservation
easement and income tax credit program on land conservation.

x f ° ceco includes

population change over the period o f analysis. In estimating equation 4.4, I used data
from 46 states for the years 1987-2007. Michigan, Alaska, Hawaii and Wisconsin are not
included in the analysis. Michigan was excluded from the analysis because there is no
CU program in the state. Alaska and Hawaii were not included due to some missing
information. Wisconsin is also not included since the CU law in Wisconsin was not
enacted until 1995, although the law was passed in 1974. Random effect panel data
regression was used to estimate equation 4.4.
In determining whether states with penalties increasing over time have any
differences in the amount of land development compared to the states with declining or
constant penalties, I estimate the following model:
Yil= f ( X ^ u' , X f u ,X lf,nd, X ^ r'cu,X f ),her,X floceco) + s il

(4.5)

Compared to equation 4.4, equation 4.5 includes a dummy variable ( X f u ) to
indicate CU penalties that have risen compared to the previous year. In equation 4.5,
Xf:u includes CU property tax savings and internal rate o f returns (IRR). All other

variables in 4.5 are the same as described in equation 4.4. In estimating 4 .5 ,1 used all the
30 states with any sort o f a CU withdrawal penalty. Wisconsin is the only state with a CU

14 FDI;,= Agricultural income/Total incom e
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withdrawal penalty that was omitted in estimating equation 4.5. A random effect panel
data regression was used to estimate equation 4.5.
In determining whether rates o f residential development are influenced by the
amount o f CU acres in New Hampshire, I estimate the following model:
Y„

(4.6)

In equation 4.6, Y„ represents the number o f residential permits issued by each town
in New Hampshire. In equation 4.6,

Xft u

is a vector o f time dependent CU

characteristics. The variables related to the CU program are percentage o f CU land
enrolled and CU penalties per acre, if land is withdrawn. x f oao~ecm is a vector containing
population change (per 1,000) in each year and average annual daily traffic data (AADT).
The vector X f ‘BDcontains two dummy variables introducing towns located within 50
miles from Boston, MA and Manchester, NH. In estimating equation 4.6, I used town
level data from 231 New Hampshire towns for the years 1999-2011. Equation 4.6 was
estimated using random effect panel data technique.

4.4 Results and Discussion
This section presents the results from two studies carried out for this chapter. First,
I present the descriptive statistics for the state level comparison study on land
development rates. Then, I present the random effect regression analysis results o f the
state level land development comparison study and the residential development study o f
New Hampshire.
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4.4.1

Descriptive Statistics

Detailed summary statistics for the years 1987 and 2007 are shown in tables 4.4 and
4.5. As shown, the mean FDI has declined from 2.39 in 1987 to 1.15 by the year 2007,
indicating a proportional reduction o f farm income compared to total income in a state.
Similarly, the percentage o f cropland has decreased to 21 percent in 2007, compared to
25 percent in 1987. In contrast, the percentage o f urban land has increased to 7 percent,
compared to 5.7 percent in 1987.
Figure 4.2 shows the changes in severity o f penalty during the years 1987-2007. As
shown, in most o f the states the severity o f penalty has declined over the years. This
decline in severity o f penalty is mostly observed in states with roll-back penalties. Figure
4.3 and table 4.6 show the number o f residential building permits issued by counties in
New Hampshire from 1999-2011. As shown, the counties Hillsborough, Rockingham and
Strafford have issued a higher number o f permits during the period o f study. Starting in
2006, the average number o f residential permits issued by a town has declined
irrespective o f the county, reaching an annual average number o f permits issued to 10 or
below. This sharp decline in the number o f residential permits issued can be explained by
the 2007 Great Recession experienced by the U.S. economy.
Results o f the three random effect panel data regressions (equations 4.4-4.6) are
presented in the next section.
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4.4.2

Random Effect Panel Data Regression Results
The first objective o f this paper is to find the influence o f withdrawal penalties on

the rate o f land development across states. The estimations obtained for the analyses are
presented in table 4.7. In models 1 and 2, the dependent variable is the percentage o f land
developed compared to the total land in the state. The difference between models 1 and 2
is that in model 1 CU penalties are used as an independent variable; in contrast, model 2
uses a dummy variable to represent the states with penalties that rise over time.
As expected, an increase in CU property tax savings results in significantly lower
rates o f land development (see models 1 and 2). Also the results suggest that states with a
higher proportion o f federal land have lower rates in land development. As shown in
table 4.7, states that are heavily dependent on agricultural income compared to their total
income have lower rates in land development (not significant). As expected, states with a
conservation reserve program (CRP) have lower rates in land development. The results
. also suggest, if a state imposes conservation restrictions upon CU enrollment, such states
will have lower rates in land development (see table 4.7). As expected, an increase in
population results in a significant increase in land developed in a state (model 1).
I hypothesized that CU penalties discourage land development, but rising
penalties may encourage farmers to withdraw land from the program for development
purposes. As shown in the results o f model 1, states with CU penalties have lower rates
o f land development. However, the effect is highly insignificant. Results from model 2 do
not support my hypothesis, the states with rising penalties experience faster development
compared to the states with declining penalties. This rise in CU withdrawal penalties
could be mainly attributed to a rise in market value o f land. Penalties that are based on
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market value o f land at the time o f sale are affected by a rise in market value. Penalties
that are based on tax savings are influenced by a rising market value, because landowners
receive an increase in tax savings by enrolling land.
This chapter also focuses on finding out whether the CU program in New
Hampshire has influenced residential development. As suggested by Berry (1993), most
of the land withdrawn from the CU program in New Hampshire has been withdrawn for
residential development. I extended her analysis for all the towns in New Hampshire. The
results o f the residential development analysis are shown in table 4.8. The dependent
variable for this analysis is the average number o f residential permits issued by a town in
an year. As expected, an increase in CU land in a town has resulted in a significant
decrease in residential permits issued in a year. The results also suggest an increase in
property tax savings results in a decline in number o f residential permits issued. Also the
results indicate higher residential development in towns located within 50 miles o f
Boston and Manchester. As expected, an increase in population also results in an increase
in residential land development.

4.5 Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research
CU programs have been implemented in the U.S. to provide substantial tax relief to
agricultural and forestry landowners. In some states, the landowners with open space land
do qualify to receive CU property tax savings. As discussed in chapter 2, the tax relief
landowners receive by enrolling land plays a major role in the amount o f land enrolled in
the CU program. In addition, it is important to explore whether the tax relief received
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indirectly results in lowering the conversion o f undeveloped land to developed uses.
Existing literature about the CU program suggests that the program might be helpful in
preventing property tax driven development, resulting in lowering the rates o f land
development. However, no empirical studies relating land development and the CU
program are found in the existing literature (to my knowledge). Therefore, this chapter
focused on addressing the land development issue focusing on the CU program.
The factors emphasized in this chapter are the percentage o f land enrolled in the
CU program, the penalties imposed if land is withdrawn from the program and whether
CU withdrawal penalties are rising, declining or constant within the length o f the enrolled
period. I used two sets o f data to analyze whether the CU program helps to reduce the
rates of land development. The first dataset consists o f state level information on the CU
program.

Finding detailed state level information on CU programs was difficult and

therefore, with the information that was available, I simulated data on CU penalties and
CU savings for further analysis. The simulated dataset is used to understand the influence
of CU penalties on state level land development for the period 1987-2007. The second
dataset consists o f residential land development data from New Hampshire for the years
1999-2011. I used the average number o f new residential permits issued by towns as a
proxy in land development in New Hampshire.
In contrast to my hypothesis, results suggest that there is no significant effect o f
CU penalties on the rates of land development across states. It is possible that some o f the
independent variables o f Xft u in equation 4.4 and equation 4.5 suffer from possible
endogeneity issues. Variables in a regression can be endogenous for several reasons.
Simultaneity (i.e. reverse causation), measurement error and omitted variable bias, are the
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leading causes o f endogeneity (Verbeek, 2008). The two main variables I am interested in
in this research could be a perfect example o f endogeneity due to reverse causation. It is
not clear how states did assign different withdrawal penalties or at least why some states
impose CU penalties upon withdrawal, while some states do not impose a penalty. States
with high land development potential could lean towards the imposition o f a stricter
penalty, which, on the other hand, states with increasing penalties could have higher rates
o f development. This possibility o f reverse causation between the percentage rise in
developed land compared to state’s land total and CU penalties, could lead to inconsistent
and biased linear estimates. An instrumental variable approach would be appropriate in
case o f reverse causation that I suspect in equations 4.4. and 4.5.
As indicated by IRR, if landowners do not get a financial advantage by enrolling
in the program (i.e. if penalties are greater than tax savings received by enrolling land),
rates of land development in such states are higher (see model 2). Also, the results
suggest that the percentage o f federal land and the presence o f other conservation
programs such as the conservation reserve program (CRP) help to lower the rates o f land
development in the U.S.
The analysis done using residential development information from New
Hampshire, suggests that CU savings per acre and amount o f CU land in a town influence
the residential development in the state. According to the results, an increase in CU land
leads to lower issuance o f residential permits and, therefore, a slower increase in
residential development too. In this essay, I chose only New Hampshire residential
development data to study the influence o f a CU program on residential land
development. Using only one state’s data leads to some limitations due to lack o f
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variation in residential development patterns. Using more states to compare residential
development with CU programs would provide more insight into CU program features on
residential land development across states.
The analyses o f this chapter were performed with a great constraint in availability
o f property tax rates and CU data for all the states. Therefore, I simulated a dataset for
further analyses across states to find out whether CU programs influence the reduction o f
the rates o f land development. The property tax rates that were simulated using property
tax burden per capita and year 2000 actual property tax rates, may add some bias to my
analysis depending on market situations. Property tax burden per capita has been stable in
New Hampshire from 1995-2009 (see figure 4.1). This indicates that property tax rates
have been adjusted given the market situations, i.e. lower property tax rates in economic
slowdowns and higher property tax rates in economic expansions. It is less likely that
simulated property tax rates would capture such variations, which is a limitation o f my
data. If actual property tax rates and CU program data were available for all the states, the
analyses done in this chapter would be more accurate and could be extended for detailed
analyses. This would open up an important extension to the w ork done in this chapter:
research as to whether CU programs are crowding in or crowding out (Parker &
Thurman, 2011) federal land conservation programs.
When considering the substitutability or complementarity o f the New Hampshire
land conservation and CU programs, results suggest that an increase in CU land results in
a reduction o f land enrolled in other conservation programs (model 5). In New
Hampshire, withdrawal penalties collected from the CU program are partially or fully
allocated to conservation funds. For example, in Concord, the allocation o f LUCT to
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conservation funds has ranged between 25%-100% during the study period. On the other
hand, Durham and Dover have allocated 100% o f LUCT to the conservation funds since
2002 and 2001 respectively (New Hampshire Department o f Revenue Administration,
1995-2012). Therefore, it is clear that the success o f other land conservation effects does
depend on the CU program.
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Table 4.1: Summary o f Data Sources
Variable

Data Sources

Land data, agricultural land

U.S. Department o f Agriculture (USDA) -

values and net farm income:

Economic Research Service (ERS), National
Resources Inventory (NRI) and Natural
Resource Conservation Service

Population statistics:

U.S. Census Bureau

Tax revenue data:

http ://www.census, ciov/popest
Local Tax Collection Data

Tax burden data:

http ://www. censu s. gov/govs/index, html
Tax Foundation www.taxfoundation.org

Assessed value ratios o f

Lincoln Institute o f Land Policy

properties:
New Hampshire CU data

The New Hampshire Department o f Revenue
Administration (NHDRA)

Residential permit data

U.S. Department o f Commerce
http://censtats.census.gov/bldg/bldgprmt.shtml?

127

Table 4.2: Property Tax Burden to per Capita Income and Simulated Property Tax Rates
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi

2000 Tax
Rate

2000 Tax
Burden

Ratio

Property Tax Burdens
1982-1989 1990-1999

2000-2010

8.72

8.52

5.29
9.42
9.00
10.33
9.22
11.27
8.81
8.84
9.43
10.13
10.25
9.67
8.75
10.05
9.65

5.49
8.73
9.54
10.57
8.62
11.24

10.11

9.66
8.25
10.55
10.26
10.05
9.55
10.12

3.78
12.44
7.39
7.00
7.20
6.52
14.33
6.32
11.71
8.55
3.08
9.06
16.07
9.51
12.87
11.56

8.50
4.80
8.60
9.00
10.20
8.60
10.80
8.40
8.30
9.10
9.50
9.90
9.10
8.20
9.10
9.20

0.44
2.59
0.86
0.78
0.71
0.76
1.33
0.75
1.41
0.94
0.32
0.92
1.77
1.16
1.41
1.26

8.63
5.69
9.24
8.38
10.08
9.24
9.85
9.05
8.06
9.13
9.53
9.86
9.66
8.45
10.03
9.08

7.24
3.59
13.03
11.21
11.15
12.36
11.47
6.18

9.60
8.00
10.60
10.10
9.70
9.40
9.90
8.70

0.75
0.45
1.23
1.11
1.15
1.31
1.16
0.71

9.19
7.50
10.35
10.26
10.36
10.03
10.60
8.54

7.90
10.82
10.44
10.66
9.75
10.55
8.84

9.03
8.68
9.18
9.75
9.69
9.60
8.95
9.20
9.45

8.65

Calculated Property Tax Rates
1982-1989 1990-1999 2000-2010
3.84
14.74
7.94
6.51
7.11
7.00
13.07
6.81
11.37
8.57
3.09
9.03
17.06
9.80
14.18
11.40
6.93
3.37
12.72
11.39
11.91
13.18
12.28
6.06

3.88
13.71
8.09
7.00
7.29
6.99
14.95
6.63
12.47
8.86
. 3.28
9.38
17.08
10.15
14.21
12.13
7.62
3.55
13.30
11.59
12.25
12.82
12.22
6.28

3.79
14.23
7.50
7.42
7.46
6.53
14.91
6.79
12.25
8.63
3.16
8.87
16.95
10.39
13.01
11.87
7.29
3.70
12.96
11.39
11.56
12.55
11.72
6.14

State
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

2000 Tax
Rate
9.22

2000 Tax
Burden

Ratio

Property Tax Burdens
1982-1989 1990-1999

16.44
7.92
19.90
20.48
6.14
18.34
7.63
16.87
12.05
7.98
10.45
15.13
16.72
5.49
16.10
7.63

8.90
8.50
9.20
6.90
7.30
10.70
9.50
11.60
9.20
9.00
9.90
9.10
9.70
9.50
10.80
8.60
6.90
6.90

1.04
1.28
1.79
1.15
2.73
1.91
0.65
1.58
0.83
1.87
1.22
0.88
1.08
1.59
1.55
0.64
2.33
1.11

8.79
8.90
9.53
7.36
7.65
11.00
8.64
12.14
9.33
9.20
9.50
8.54
10.76
9.83
10.59
9.00
8.00
7.46

16.98
6.37
17.75
8.91
10.24
5.34
18.51
5.92

7.10
9.90
9.70
9.40
8.50
9.20
11.10
6.30

2.39
0.64

7.41
10.04
10.21
9.29
9.03
9.54

10.88

1.83
0.95
1.20
0.58
1.67
0.94

11.81
6.94

9.31
9.01
9.77
7.41
8.47
11.54
9.75
12.24
9.70
9.47
9.95
9.33
10.51
10.03
11.13
8.92
7.51
7.50

2000-2010

9.09
8.59
9.73
7.50
7.65
11.46
8.83
12.03
9.70
8.85
10.07
8.91
17.48
10.07
10.83

7.97
10.13

8.59
7.21
7.39
7.55
9.84

10.49
9.52
9.46
9.20
11.59
6.34

10.16
9.36
9.08
9.37
10.79
6.77

Calculated Property Tax Rates
1982-1989 1990-1999 2000-2010
9.10
11.39
17.02
8.45
20.85
21.05
5.58
19.19
7.73
17.24
11.56
7.49
11.59
15.65
16.39
5.75
18.67
8.25
17.73
6.46
18.69
8.80
10.87
5.54
19.70
6.52

9.64
11.53
17.46
8.51
23.09
22.09
6.30
19.35
8.04
17.75
12.11
8.18
11.32
15.97
17.23
5.69
17.52
8.29
19.06
6.52
19.20
9.02
11.40
5.34
19.33
5.96

9.42
11.00
17.38
8.61
20.84
21.94
5.71
19.02
8.04
16.60
12.26
7.81
18.83
16.04
16.76
5.48
16.82
8.17
18.07
6.33
18.60
8.88
10.94

5.44
17.99
6.36

Table 4.3: Current Use Assessment - Based on Capitalization Rate or Some Fraction of Fair Market Value
State

Year

M arket
Value per
Acre

Assess
Value

CU Value

Prop. Tax
Saving
Per Acre

Accumulated
Tax Savings

Penalty if
Withdrawn

California
Assess Val: 100%
PropTaxRate~7
CAP Rate~2-8

1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007

1553.6
1742.0
2077.0
2213.0
2220.0
2500.0
2800.0
3200.0
3600.0
5050.0
5960.0

1553.6
1742.0
2077.0
2213.0
2220.0
2500.0
2800.0
3200.0
3600.0
5050.0
5960.0

90.0
92.9
31.0
57.9
20.5
26.6
41.4
33.8
58.0
89.1
129.3

106.4
117.6
148.8
159.7
161.5
178.1
194.7
234.7
255.0
360.7
444.5

106.4
328.6
611.7
929.0
1249.1
1601.5
1981.8
2429.8
2926.7
3557.9
4393.9

194.2
217.8
259.6
276.6
277.5
312.5
350.0
400.0
450.0
631.3
745.0

Georgia
Assess Val: 30%
PropTaxRate~8
CAP Rate~l. 5-5.0

1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007

888.8
1030.0
1095.0
1131.0
1260.0
1430.0
1630.0
1900.0
2200.0
3140.0
4350.0

266.6
309.0
328.5
339.3
378.0
429.0
489.0
570.0
660.0
942.0
1305.0

20.8
34.4
34.3
40.7
33.5
36.9
57.3
75.4
86.9
126.2
152.6

21.0
24.0
26.3
27.2
30.7
33.9
36.9
42.8
48.5
69.8
100.7

21.0
66.6
119.7
170.6
228.0
294.7
366.6
449.0
544.8
665.9
857.7

105.1
96.0
78.8
54.4
30.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

Table 4.4: Summary Statistics - 1987
Variables

Unit o f Measurement

Mean

.

Std.

Min

Max

Dev
CU Program Variables

CU Value

Dollars per acre

39.67

86.30

0.18

456.65

Property Tax Savings

Dollars per acre

99.93

138.27

0.95

655.96

Agriculture Land Value

Dollars per acre

1040.7

874.22

Agriculture Land Value

Dollars per acre

rl21,99

275.80

-583.91

625.88

Crop land

Percentage of total land

24.88

20.55

1.21

78.12

Forest Land

Percentage of total land

38.34

23.42

1.04

87.90

Rural Transportation

Percentage of total land

1.56

0.69

0.45

2.99

Land15
Urban Land16

Percentage of total land

5.70

7.21

0.15

29.53

Federal Land

Percentage of total land

14.24

20.42

0.42

84.48

Developed Land

Percentage of total land

6.64

6.49

0.39

2-7.37

Rural Land

Percentage of total land

74.88

18.38

14.52

95.78

Rise in Developed

Percentage change in

0.59

0.70

0.01

3.95

Land

developed land
2.39

3.15

0.16

13.24

Land Variables

156.00 3729.00

Socio-Economic Variables

Farm Dependency

Index

Index (FDI)
Population Change

Per 1000

38.47

51.81

-58.13

189.37

(1982-1987)
Net Farm Income (NFI)

Dollars per acre

77.79

104.78

1.37

619.99

Capitalization Rate

Rate per 100

4.80

2.70

0.80

10.30

Property Tax Revenue

Percentage of tax revenue

1.73

3.46

0.00

15.77

Sales Tax Revenue

Percentage of tax revenue

50.94

15.18

13.52

84.53

Income Tax Revenue

Percentage of tax revenue

34.00

16.93

0.00

71.50

15 Rural transportation: Highways, roads, and railroad rights-of way, plus airport facilities outside an urban
area
16 Urban area: D ensely populated areas with at least 50,000 people (“urbanized areas”) and densely
populated areas with 2,500 to 50,000 people (“urban clusters”)
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Table 4.5: Summary Statistics - 2007'
Variables

Unit of Measurement

Mean

Std.

Min

Max

Dev
CU Program Variables
CU Value

Dollars per acre

111.00

237.37

-0.78

1411.74

Property Tax Savings

Dollars per acre

383.26

606.36

2.97

2872.47

Agriculture Land Value

Dollars per acre

3865.22

3832.8

460.00

16400.0

Agriculture Land Value

Dollars per acre

698.36

312.30

294.12

1891.89

Crop land

Percentage of total land

21.19

19.17

1.04

74.76

Forest Land

Percentage of total land

38.50

22.82

1.58

87.86

Rural Transportation

Percentage of total land
1.51

0.57

0.51

2.91

Land Variables

Land
Urban Land

Percentage of total land

7.05

10.36

0.18

38.26

Federal Land

Percentage of total land

14.34

20.43

0.43

84.60

Developed Land

Percentage of total land

9.39

8.68

0.82

35.46

Rural Land

Percentage of total land

71.97

18.42

13.96

95.39

Rise in Developed

Percentage change in
0.55

0.46

0.01

1.90

1.15

1.56

0.03

7.96

49.32

44.00

-20.14

185.36

127.40

124.49

-0.65

531.22

developed land
Land
Socio-Economic Variables
Farm Dependency
Index (FDI)
Population Change

Index
Per 1000

(2002-2007)
Net Farm Income (NFI)

Dollars per acre

Capitalization Rate

Rate per 100

3.21

2.47

0.32

12.35

Property Tax Revenue

Percentage of tax revenue

2.75

6.16

0.00

34.68

Sales Tax Revenue

Percentage of tax revenue

46.67

15.91

10.11

81.30

Income Tax Revenue

Percentage of tax revenue

38.94

18.33

0.00

77.51
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Table 4.1: Total Residential Permits Issued at County Level in New Hampshire 1999 - 2011
Year

Belknap

Carroll

Cheshire

Coos

Grafton

Hillsborough

Merrimack

Rockingham

Strafford

Sullivan

1999

338

333

271

93

263

1532

631

1690

448

117

2000

437

407

262

109

327

1565

669

1570

562

202

2001

409

496

235

81

390

1475

817

1416

487

147

2002

610

619

319

116

464

1605

947

1321

540

221

2003

598

622

359

110

515

1521

851

1146

581

265

2004

499

703

303

156

584

1570

916

1304

674

287

2005

557

563

337

144

482

1518

814

1133

626

244

2006

388

383

269

132

460

1085

554

790

456

210

2007

359

319

188

87

355

697

424

741

411

159

2008

210

223

124

54

237

404

249

473

214

108

2009

143

129

83

37

144

326

162

379

182

73

2010

150

138

88

44

159

367

176

481

208

68

2011

140

119

67

32

121

334

162

438

181

53

Table 4.7: State Comparison of Current Use Penalties on Land Development

Variable

M ODEL 1

MODEL 2

Estimate
Pr(>|t|)

Estimate
Pr(>lt|)

CU Program Variables

Penalty

-0.001
(0.975)

Penalty Rise (Dummy)
Property Tax Savings ($/Acre)

(0.300)
0.009
(0.968)

-0.546
(0.516)
-0.007**
(0 .002)
-0.110
(0.933)
0.420
(0.810)
-0.319
(0.430)

-0.046
(0.191)
0.845***
(0 .000)
0.712
(0.483)

-0.045
(0.317)
0.728***
(0 .000)
0.826
(0.571)

-0.007***
(0 .000)
0.635
(0.423)

Internal Rate of Return (D=l if IRR< 0)
Enrollment (Dummy, l=Automatic)

1.110

Severity of Penalty (Categories)
Land Variables

% Federal Land (Compared to Total
Land)
% Developed Land (Lag)
% Land: Rural Transportation

Socio-Economic and other Land Conservation Program Variables

Pop. Change (per 1,000)
Farm Dependency Index
Change in AGLV ($/Acre)
CRP (Dummy)
Conse. Easement (Dummy)
Income Tax Credit (Dummy)
Conservation Restriction (Dummy)
Intercept
R-Squared - overall, between, within

0 .021 *
0.016
(0.017)
(0 .200)
-0.185
-0.207
(0.353)
(0.637)
-0.001
-0.001
(0.496)
(0.702)
-0.680
-0.270
(0.438)
(0.838)
0.105
-1.282
(0.911)
(0.379)
0.108
1.516
(0.915)
(0.363)
-0.237
-1.659
(0.857)
(0.349)
-0.172
3.810
(0.939)
(0.358)
0.639, 0.812, 0.545
0.579, 0.757, 0.085
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Table 4.8: Current Use Program Influence on Residential Development in New
Hampshire
Variables
CU Program Variables
CU Percent

-41.678***
(0 .000)
-887.396***
(0 .000 )
-0.006***
(0 .000)

Full Value Tax Rate ($/1000 Value)
CU Tax Savings per Acre ($/Acre)
Socio-Economic Variables
Average Land Value ($)
Distance to Boston < 50 miles (D : Yes= 1)
Distance to Manchester < 50 miles (D : Yes=l)
Population Change (per 1000)
Average Annual Daily Traffic (AADT)
Intercept
R-Squared - overall, between, within
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1.973
(0.399)
22.478***
(0 .000 )
19.715***
(0 .000 )
80.256***
(0 :000 )
2.949**
(0.006)
55.672***
(0 .000 )
0.069, 0.014, 0.336

Figure 4.1: Comparison of Simulated Property Tax Rates and Actual Property Tax Rates in New Hampshire
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Figure 4.3: Average Number o f Residential Building Permits Issued by a Town at
County Level
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A p p e n d ix

A .l Theoretical Background o f Empirical Models Used
This section describes the theoretical background o f duration analysis (Danacica &
Babucea, 2010; Kiefer, 1988; Klein & Moeschberger, 2005), competing risk regressions
and random-effect multinomial logit models used in chapter 3.

A.1.1 D uration A nalysis

Duration analysis (also known as event history analysis, hazard analysis or
survival analysis) has been used in different fields o f study to determine the time periods
during which an event is most likely to occur, as well as why the event happened at
different periods o f time. In logistic regression, the overall probability o f an event is
considered without regard to the timing o f the event. Duration analysis allows for the
inclusion o f the longitudinal progression o f the probability o f an event occurrence,
considering the timing o f the event.
Due to the uncertainty about whether an event could happen before or after the
study period, duration analyses are preferred over simple regression or logistic regression
(Allison, 1984). Uncertainties regarding the occurrence o f an event are known as
censoring, in which individuals or jurisdictions o f interest have not experienced the event
during a period o f study or may have experienced the event before the study period. If the
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end-time is observed beyond the time period, such observations are considered to be
right-censored (see figure A .l) and the observations are considered left-censored if the
event is observed before the study period (Fox & Andersen, 2005; Kiefer, 1988; Klein &
Moeschberger, 2005). Such censoring are due to the lack o f control by the researcher
over when the event happened or may happen in the future. Right-censored observations
are common. Excluding observations o f the event from before the study period, known as
left truncated, or excluding observations o f the event from after the period o f study,
known as right truncated, would lead to serious sample size reductions. Duration analysis
directly deals with such observations, which is advantageous for most o f the researchers.
The events that happen could be categorized as discrete versus continuous time
events, repeated or non-repeated events and single versus multiple kinds o f events. In
discrete time events, observations will be grouped or banded into discrete intervals o f
time, such as for months or years (Allison, 1984; Themeau & Grambsch, 2000).
However, the event may happen in continuous time. Unavailability or not reporting of
data in continuous time could be the reason for considering continuous time data with
discrete events. Considering continuous time data with discrete time analysis is known as
interval censoring (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008). In multiple kinds o f events, the
same individual or the same observations have the possibility o f experiencing one event
out o f multiple events that are studied.
In order to consider various types o f data, numerous event history methodologies
have been developed in the past. Basic duration model is described in the following
section, which expands to describe briefly the Cox proportional hazard model and the
survivor function.
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In duration analysis, T, a random variable that represents the time o f the event,
has a cumulative distribution function represented as P (t) = Pr(T < t) , where t is the
duration o f the study. The survivor function, S(t), is the probability that an event has not "
occurred during the period o f study t, and is represented by S (t) = PrfT > 0 = 1 - P ( t) .
The probability that an event occurred before the time o f study is known as cumulative
density function and denoted as .F(f) = PtfT < f) = 1—S (t) . Modeling o f duration
(survival) data usually employs a hazard function (Kiefer, 1988) or log hazard function.
The hazard function, h(t) in general, assesses the risk o f an event happening during time t
and represented as h(t)=Pr(T= t \ T > t ) .

The Cox Proportional Hazards Model: In the duration (survival) analysis, the
relationship o f survival distribution to its covariates 17 (independent variables o f the
model) is usually examined. I f the covariates x (t) are assumed to be constant over time,
the model is referred to as the Cox Proportional Hazard model.
survival distribution to its covariates is mostly specified as
where a (t) = \ogh0(t)

The relationship o f

\oghj(t) = a (t) + /3kx ik,

is the baseline hazard function with the event o f interest

happening when all the covariates are zero (Allison, 1984; Therneau & Grambsch, 2000).
Equivalently, the Cox Hazard model can be represented as ht(t) = a(t)exp(/3kxi k).

17 In event history analysis* independent variables are referred to as covariates.
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The Survivor Function for the Cox Model: The relative risk or hazard rate (HR) of
an event for a binary covariate can be written as:

HR =

P ) = e x p q ^ - x 0) fi) = exp(P)
K (t)exp{x o P )

Using the above hazard formula, the survivor function for the Cox model can be written
as S(t) = exp(-H (l)). By writing H (t) in term o f S ( t) :

S (t) = e;*p[~J h{u).du]
= exp[—exp(xt

K (u).du]
e x p f x ,^ )

= exp [-joh0(u).du]

=[s0( t ) r ^

A.1.2 Random Effect Multinomial Logit Regression
In many studies, data occur in repeated unordered categorical form. Such repeated
measurements may add some correlated errors to the model setting. This section will
briefly discuss multinomial logit models, which are used in cross-sectional and
longitudinal settings in the presence o f unordered categorical dependent variables.
In a cross sectional setting an indirect utility function can be written as
Vip = a j + PjXu + s tJ, where j represents a unit o f observation (hereafter individual) and
xn is a set o f individual characteristics. et) is assumed to be independently and
identically distributed (Hartzel, Agresti, & Caffo, 2001; Livote, Ross, & Penrod, 2010).
The probability o f an individual’s choice is:
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exp ( aj +Xupj )
,7 = 1,2,3

J.

In the case o f such longitudinal settings, individual heterogeneity present in an
individual is likely to give some correlated errors (Long & Freese, 2006; Rabe-Hesketh,
Skrondal, & Pickles, 2004). Including such correlated errors, the above indirect utility
function can be written as Vi]l= a J +uiJ+ f}jXu + ev, where utj represents individual
heterogeneity. In this random multinomial setting, the probability o f choosing an
unordered multinomial choice can be written as:
exp (oC j+ u^+ x.P j).

_
iji

j

X e*p(«* +«,*
k=1

,7 = 1,2,3

J.

+xM

A.1.3 Com peting Risk Regressions
As discussed in section 3.2.2, standard duration analysis focuses on event-time
data that only has a single type o f event or failure. In many analyses, treating all the
events possible to one outcome would be convenient. However, such aggregation o f
information will lead to loss o f information that is relevant for the analyses. Therefore,
distinguishing different possible events or outcomes is important for many researchers.
Random effect multinomial logit (RMNL) is one alternative that researchers use to
evaluate multinomial dependent variables o f interest. Competing risks models are another
alternative (Dignam, Zhang, & Kocherginsky, 2012; Sun & Tiwari, 1995; Themeau &
Grambsch, 2000). Choosing to use competing risk models over RMNL regression
depends on the availability o f data and also the type o f data available for analyses.
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RMNL considers the effect o f different independent variables when choosing one
alternative over another, without tracking the time o f the event. Competing risk models,
on the other hand, have the capability to track the time o f the event as well as predict the
effect o f covariates on different alternatives.
Competing risk model is a model used for multiple durations that start at the same
time, where the individual or jurisdiction is observed until one o f the events being
analyzed is occurred. However, we should note that some o f the units in the analysis may
have also experienced the event before the period o f analysis, which we consider as leftcensored observations in duration analysis.
One o f the common approaches to modeling competing risk models is known as
cause-specific or type specific hazard function. In estimating cause-specific competing
risk hazard models, the model proposed by Cox in 1972 is widely used (Sun & Tiwari,
1995). In cause-specific models, if the total number o f possible events equals J, then the
probability o f an event j happening during the time period t and t + At can be written as
P-(t,t + A t). Considering the above probability, the cause-specific hazard rate is written
as follows (Allison, 1984; Steele et al., 2004):

h. (t) = lim Pr, (I, t + At) / At
where, each event type has its own hazard function and the overall hazard function h(t)
is the summation of all the competing risk functions. The hazard that no event o f any type
m

occurs at time t can be given as: h0(t) = \ - ' ^ h j {f).W ith covariates (jc#), the above
J= l

hazard rate can also be expressed as:
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¥r(t < T < t + &t\T >t,Xi)
h ( t , x ) = l i m--------------------- '----------J

A/->0

‘

At

The overall hazard rate is represented by h(t) = y , /i,.(Q.

Based on the above, the probability o f the occurrence o f an event j can be given in the
following cumulative incidence function (CIF):

J
/

I j (t) = hj (u)du = Pr(T < t and J = j )
0

Competing risks can be modeled simultaneously using a multinomial logit, or
used to consider competing risks separately, treating all other events as censored (Sun &
Tiwari, 1995). In estimating competing risk models, two approaches are widely used
(Dignam et al., 2012). The approaches are using Cox Proportional Hazards model to
obtain cause-specific hazards, and using the Fine and Gray model to obtain cumulative
incidence rates.
In the Fine and Gray model, cumulative incidence ftinction (CIF) is considered to
be a survival function, and underlying hazard is calculated (Fine & Gray, 1999; Steele et
al., 2004). The hazards o f the Fine and Gray model are referred to as sub-hazard and
d
hXt)
denoted as hj (t, x ) , where hj (/, x) = — - log(l - / y(r, x)) dt
J
l- /,( 0

= ^ o(O exp (x,^ )

hjo is the baseline sub-hazard for type j events, and exp(x,/^) is the relative risk
associated with covariates x.
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Figures

Figure A.1: Censoring
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